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SEARCHING FOR EQUITY AMID A SYSTEM
OF SCHOOLS: THE VIEW FROM NEW
ORLEANS
Robert Garda*
ABSTRACT
Hurricane Katrina leveled both the buildings and governance
structure of the New Orleans school system. The system was
transformed from one elected school board controlling nearly all the
schools to a system of schools with sixty-three school districts
operating within the city’s geographic boundaries that are run by
forty-four independent school boards.
There is not a more
decentralized school governance structure in the United States. This
Article discusses how this new system of schools is attempting to
achieve equal educational opportunities for its most vulnerable and
at-risk student populations: the poor, minorities, students with
disabilities, and English Language Learners.
For the first seven years after Katrina, the system of schools
operated with virtually no centralized planning or unified services,
instead pushing all decision-making and service provision down to the
autonomous schools. With little oversight, the schools became
balkanized by race, class, and ability because of unequal access,
retention, and service provision, and because certain schools are
specialized for discrete student populations. It became apparent that
centralizing certain services and unifying policies was essential to
creating equal opportunities for vulnerable students, which slowly
began occurring in 2012.
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Today, New Orleans education stands at a crossroads in deciding
how to achieve equity for its vulnerable student populations. One
route relies on centralizing services, planning, and oversight to ensure
that every school provides an appropriate education to any type of
student that walks through the schoolhouse door. This path embraces
the version of inclusion equality set forth in Brown v. Board of
Education: “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”
The other route relies on the market driven reform underlying the
charter movement to create specialized schools to fill the unmet
demands of vulnerable populations.
This route embraces an
emerging view of equality—where separate can be equal, possibly
even superior, if parents are empowered to maximize their child’s
academic outcomes in specialized settings. This Article argues that
New Orleans is headed down this latter route and identifies the
lessons that can be learned from its evolution to a system of schools.
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INTRODUCTION
New Orleans has been the epicenter of education reform since
Hurricane Katrina decimated the city and its schools in August of
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2005.1 In the storm’s aftermath, New Orleans schools were remade
based on the education reforms of the day: charter schools, choice,
and state takeover of failing schools. The Recovery School District
(RSD), an arm of the state Department of Education, wrested control
of over ninety percent of the schools from the Orleans Parish School
Board (OPSB) and chartered these schools to private operators over
the course of the next nine years. In the 2014–15 school year, the
RSD became the first district in the United States to have one
hundred percent charter schools.2 With seventy-four charter schools,
sixty-seven private schools, and only six traditional schools run
directly by an elected school board, New Orleans is “reinventing itself
as a decentralized system of schools.”3
The changes in New Orleans are called a “grand experiment in
urban education for the nation”4 that could “shake the foundation of
American education.”5 While the reforms are touted as a “roadmap”
and a “model” for other cities to follow,6 and many are in fact

1. Walter Isaacson, The Greatest Educational Lab, TIME, Sept. 17, 2007, at 47;
Patrik Jonsson, As New Orleans Restarts its Schools, Most are Now Charter Schools,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 4, 2007, at 1 (positing that New Orleans is the
“proving ground” for charter schools); Lesli A. Maxwell, City Yearns for Rebirth
Among Ruin, EDUC. WK. (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2007/
08/15/45nolaoverview.h26.html (explaining that the efforts to rebuild New Orleans’s
education system is “one of the nation’s most important education stories”).
2. PATRICK SIMS & DEBRA VAUGHAN, THE COWEN INST., THE STATE OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS 2014 REPORT 8 (2014) [hereinafter THE COWEN INST.,
2014 REPORT], available at http://www.speno2014.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/
SPENO-Small.pdf; Kari Dequine Harden, New Orleans Nearing a ‘Privatized’ Public
School System, LA. WKLY. (June 2, 2014), http://www.louisianaweekly.com/neworleans-nearing-a-privatized-public-school-system/ (stating that RSD is the nation’s
first “completely privatized school system”); Lyndsey Layton, In New Orleans, Major
School District Closes Traditional Public Schools for Good, WASH. POST, May 28,
2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/in-new-orleans-traditionalpublic-schools-close-for-good/2014/05/28/ae4f5724-e5de-11e3-8f90-73e071f3d637_
story.html.
3. John Ayers, Introduction to THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2;
Anya Kamenetz, The End of Neighborhood Schools, NPR.ORG (Sept. 2, 2014),
http://apps.npr.org/the-end-of-neighborhood-schools/; see also Dawn Ruth, Amazing
Recovery: Incredibly, a Model School System, NEW ORLEANS MAG., Aug. 2014,
http://www.myneworleans.com/New-Orleans-Magazine/August-2014/AmazingRecovery/ (explaining that the centralized school system in New Orleans is finished).
4. Layton, supra note 2.
5. DAVID OSBORNE, THIRD WAY, BORN ON THE BAYOU: A NEW MODEL FOR
AMERICAN EDUCATION 2 (2012), available at http://content.thirdway.org/publications
/579/Third_Way_Report_-_Born_on_the_Bayou-A_New_Model_for_American_
Education.pdf.
6. Id.; Jeff Bryant, Look out, Chris Christie: The New War on Public Schools
Just Might Be Defeated, SALON (June 3, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/06/03/
look_out_chris_christie_the_new_war_on_public_schools_just_might_be_defeated/
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emulating the reforms,7 the critical question is whether they are
working.
In the modern-day accountability era, test scores and graduation
rates are the primary measures by which to answer this question.
Debate rages over whether the new system of schools in New Orleans
has actually improved student academic gains. The state and charter
proponents tout the growth rate of positive indicators for students
and schools since Katrina,8 while opponents point to low benchmark
performance,9 data showing there has been no growth,10 the

(noting that think tanks on both sides of the political spectrum have touted the New
Orleans model as “what should come next” in school reform).
7. See Ayers, supra note 3 (explaining that many districts are beginning to try
decentralization and a “mutilayered governance model”); Danielle Dreilinger,
Success of Recovery School District Considered at National Conference, TIMESPICAYUNE, July 28, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/07/challenge_
of_recovery_school_d.html (showing that Michigan and Tennessee state takeover
districts are modeled on RSD); Ingrid Jacques, Column: A New Orleans Model for
Detroit?, DETROIT NEWS (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/
editorials/2014/08/29/column-a-new-orleans-model-for-detroit/14817041/ (establishing
New Orleans as a potential model for Detroit); OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 23.
8. See, e.g., THE COWEN INST., NOLA BY THE NUMBERS: SCHOOL ENROLLMENT
AND DEMOGRAPHICS FROM OCT. 2013, at 1 (2014) [hereinafter THE COWEN INST.,
NOLA BY THE NUMBERS] (showing that the number of students in D or F schools
decreased from 23% in the 2012–2013 school year to 14% in the 2013–2014 school
year); Peter Cook, When All Else Fails File a Civil Rights Complaint, PE+CO (July
8, 2014), http://peterccook.com/2014/07/08/when-all-else-fails/ (highlighting that
student performance in New Orleans is improving at a much faster rate than in the
rest of the state); Danielle Dreilinger, John White: New Orleans Charter Civil Rights
Complaint ‘a Joke’, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 15, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/
index.ssf/2014/05/john_white_new_orleans_charter.html [hereinafter Dreilinger, New
Orleans Charter Civil Rights Complaint ‘a Joke’] (explaining that before Katrina,
35% of students attended nonfailing schools, and now that figure is at 92%); Danielle
Dreilinger, New Orleans High School Exam Results, Graduation Rate Near State
Average, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 11, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/
2014/07/new_orleans_high_school_exam_r.html [hereinafter Dreilinger, New Orleans
High School Exam Results] (reporting that student performance on end of course
exams in New Orleans was approaching the state average); Kamenetz, supra note 3
(“[T]he city has posted the largest, fastest improvement in test scores ever produced
in an urban public school system.”); Layton, supra note 2 (explaining that in 2007,
only 23% of students tested at grade level in math, but in 2013 that percentage rose
to 57%, and before Katrina the graduation rate was 54.4%, but in 2013 the
graduation was 77.6%); OSBORNE, supra note 5 (noting that RSD schools have
improved faster than any other schools in the state).
9. See, e.g., THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 20 (noting that
performance lags behind most other school districts); Harden, supra note 2 (pointing
out that the average ACT score of students in RSD schools is not good enough to get
into any Louisiana four year college, and is well below the state average; and noting
that only four Louisiana school districts had a lower ACT average than the RSD).
10. See, e.g., Jeff Bryant, The Truth About the New Orleans School Reform
Model, EDUC. OPPORTUNITY NETWORK (Aug. 6, 2014), http://educationopportunity
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manipulation of state standards and data that create an illusion of
improvement,11 and the plateauing of student and school academic
gains.12 Both sides are correct: schools in New Orleans steadily
improved after Katrina, but the district as a whole remains one of the
lowest performing districts in one of the lowest performing states in
the nation.13 Charter advocates emphasize the stronger performance
network.org/the-dishonest-case-for-the-new-orleans-school-reform-model/
(noting
that RSD schools are in the seventeenth percentile among all Louisiana schools for
performance on the state standardized LEAP test, which is about the same percentile
ranking of the schools before the takeover, while student performance on the NAEP
has remained static); Michael Deshotels, LEAP Scores Manipulated, LA. EDUCATOR
(Aug.
17,
2014),
http://louisianaeducator.blogspot.com/2014/08/leap-scoresmanipulated.html (explaining that the percentage of students passing the LEAP
remained steady despite the LEAP getting harder because the number of correct
answers for a passing score was significantly reduced in three of four categories).
11. Beginning in the 2012–2013 school year, the Louisiana Department of
Education changed the scale by which schools are given SPS scores. THE COWEN
INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 20. When the scale changed, there were fiftyfive percent fewer F schools but also fewer A schools. Id. The grades converged
towards the middle of the pack. Id. “[T]he main reason RSD has made such great
strides in grade level performance is that from 2012 to 2013 the state changed the
formula and scale for measuring school performance, which artificially inflated
RSD’s score.” Bryant, supra note 10. Of thirty-seven RSD schools with complete
information, twenty-six increased a letter grade due to change in the scoring system.
Id. If the same standards had applied, fifteen schools would have received a D
instead of a C, five would have received an F instead of a D, and five would have
received a C instead of a B. Id. The district letter grade would have remained a D.
Id.; see also Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans’ Recovery System Changes Heighten
Charter School Debate, NPR Reports, TIMES-PICAYUNE, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2014/08/new_orleans_recovery_system_op.html (explaining that
the growth in non-failing schools is partly because failed schools recently turned over
to new operators are not included in the statistics); Harden, supra note 2 (contrasting
the state’s praise of school performance in New Orleans with the blogosphere’s
“carefully documented details of the state’s systemic and persistent manipulation—
and illegal withholding—of public data”).
12. See School Performance Scores Released: 2013–14 Was a Stand Still Year,
EDUCATE NOW, http://campaign.r20.constantcontact.com/render?ca=3d310f92-4d4b4b3b-b8f5-5626177c4106&c=d405bca0-356d-11e3-b8bb-d4ae52a459cd&ch=d4dff000356d-11e3-b928-d4ae52a459cd (showing that after seven years of growth, the School
Performance Scores and overall district score remained flat in the 2013–2014 school
year).
13. PATRICK SIMS & DEBRA VAUGHAN, THE COWEN INST., BEATING THE ODDS:
ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE AND VULNERABLE STUDENT POPULATIONS IN NEW
ORLEANS PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS 9 (2014) [hereinafter SIMS & VAUGHAN, BEATING
THE ODDS]; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE FOUND., LEADERS & LAGGARDS: A
STATE-BY-STATE REPORT CARD ON K-12 EDUCATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 63 (2014),
available
at
http://www.leadersandlaggards.org/sites/default/files/Leaders%20
and%20Laggards%20A%20State-by-State%20Report%20Card%20on%20K-12%20
Educational%20Effectiveness.pdf; Jessica Williams, New Orleans Public Schools
Have Seen Successes, Challenges in Past Year, New Report Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Aug. 6, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/08/new_orleans_public_
schools_have_seen_successes_challenges_in_past_year_new_report_says.html
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of students in charter schools than in traditional schools,14 while
opponents claim that student demographic and school funding
differences pre- and post-Katrina, and between charter and noncharter schools, make comparisons impossible.15 Again, there is an
element of truth in each of these polar positions: a perfect apples-toapples comparison is impossible, but the best available data indicates
that charter schools are improving student performance in New
Orleans.16 The schools are almost certainly better academically, but
at what cost?
One of the most repeated “costs” of the new system of schools is
that it does not respond to community and neighborhood needs. By
divorcing school attendance from place of residence, New Orleans
lost the neighborhood school that provided numerous support
mechanisms to the surrounding community.17 In a city where the
average student lives over three miles from school, and one in four
travels over five miles, it is virtually impossible for the schools to be
the community centers they were before the storm.18 Neighborhood
schools were anchors binding small communities together; the charter
schools that replaced them are not.19

(explaining that while there is academic progress, scores still lag behind other public
school systems).
14. From 2005 to 2011, New Orleans charter schools performed significantly
better than traditional public school counterparts. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC.
OUTCOMES, CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN LOUISIANA 7 (2013).
15. Layton, supra note 2; William J. Mathis & Andrew Maul, New Orleans

Charter School Study: Comparing Incomparables, Repeated Errors, and Small
Differences, NAT’L EDUC. POL’Y CENTER (Aug. 22, 2013), http://nepc.colorado.edu/
newsletter/2013/08/review-credo-2013-NOLA (“But the evidence provided by the
new CREDO study falls well short of Gov. Jindal’s ‘proof’ of the success of charter
schools in either the city or the state.”).
16. PATRICK SIMS & VINCENT ROSSMEIER, THE COWEN INST., THE STATE OF
PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS: TEN YEARS AFTER HURRICAN KATRINA 18–
20 (2015), available at http://www.speno2015.com/images/SPENO.2015.small.pdf.
17. Layton, supra note 2; Daniel Kiel, The Endangered School District: The
Challenge and Promise of Redistributing Control of Public Education, 22 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 341, 357–58 (2014) (explaining how a “portfolio” model of schools lessens
democratic accountability).
18. Danielle Dreilinger, How One New Orleans Neighborhood Worked to
Reopen Its School—And Lost, TIMES-PICAYUNE July 21, 2014, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2014/07/hollygrove_the_recovery_school.html; Kamenetz, supra
note 3; Katy Reckdahl, New Orleans’ Afterschool Scene Has a Transportation
Problem, NEXT CITY (Sept. 9, 2014), http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/new-orleansenviable-afterschool-scene-has-a-transportation-problem
(explaining
that
connections to community resources are made more easily in traditional
neighborhood school systems).
19. Susan L. DeJarnatt, Community Losses: The Costs of Education Reform, 45
U. TOL. L. REV. 579, 586–88 (2014); Civil Rights Complaint from Journey for Justice
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Another “cost”—one that often gets overshadowed by the loud
debate about outcome data and community loss—is equity. While the
entire system may be improving, it is important to understand
whether it is at the expense of marginalized, subordinated, and
vulnerable students, schools, or neighborhoods.20 This Article focuses
on equity when answering the question of whether the New Orleans
system of schools is working.
New Orleans education stands at a crossroads in deciding how to
achieve equity for its vulnerable student populations. Down the path
to the right lies the market-driven reform that underlies the charter
movement and reliance on specialized schools serving the unique
needs of each student. This is the path New Orleans followed for
seven years after the storm. Down the path to the left lie centralizing
services, planning, and oversight to ensure that every school provides
an appropriate education to any type of student that walks through
every schoolhouse door. New Orleans has moved towards this route
more recently, but political forces prevent the system from seeing the
centralization path to the end. Or New Orleans could keep a foot in
both approaches: some specialized schools but at least minimum
services provided in every school with centralized oversight.
How equal education opportunity is defined is vital to determining
which path New Orleans should ultimately choose. The traditional
view of equality, rooted in the holding of Brown vs. Board of
Education of Topeka21—that separate is inherently unequal—compels
assurance that students of all types can be served properly at every
school. Achieving “inclusion equality” requires centralizing services
for the most vulnerable students. Even the staunchest supporters of
charter schools recognize that the “decentralized nature of public
education in New Orleans creates potential barriers for the system to
equitably serve the needs of all students.”22 But the emerging view of

Alliance to Eric J. Holder, Attorney Gen., United States 15 (May 13, 2014)
[hereinafter Civil Rights Complaint], available at http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/
24a04d1624216c28b1_4pm6y9lvo.pdf.
20. Our Public Education System Needs Transformation, Not ‘Reform’, NATION
(Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/181742/our-public-educationsystem-needs-transformation-not-reform# (“Without education equity, we don’t have
an educational system at all—we have a rigged rat race that starts in kindergarten.”);
see also Eden B. Heilman, Stranger than Fiction: The Experiences of Students with
Disabilities in the Post-Katrina New Orleans Education System, 59 LOY. L. REV. 355,
380 (2014) (“A true system of choice cannot be successful unless it includes and
serves all students . . . .”).
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 3; see Scott Cowen, The
New Orleans Experiment in School Reform: Lessons Learned, HUFFINGTON POST
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equality in education is that separate can be equal if all students are
performing better in specialized environments chosen freely by the
parents. Under this “empowerment equality,” if vulnerable students
perform better in specialized charter schools that are designed to
serve them, and if overall student performance rises, then the system
may be separate, but more equal. Whether the trajectory in New
Orleans towards decentralization and specialization is “equitable”
hinges on which version of equality is accepted.
This Article focuses on the barriers to achieving equity in a system
of schools and the path New Orleans has chosen, and will likely
pursue in the future, to overcome them. Part I describes the changes
to the education system made after Katrina and the current education
landscape from a governance perspective. Part II discusses the
impact of decentralization on vulnerable populations—students with
disabilities, English language learners, African-American students,
and low-income students—and what New Orleans has done to
address equity for these groups. Finally, Part III discusses how an allcharter system of specialized schools illuminates competing theories
of equity in education. It argues that unless there is a concerted,
collective effort to pursue inclusion equality—the equality envisioned
in Brown—New Orleans will adopt the new “empowerment equality”
perspective by default because it is an inherent and natural outgrowth
of a decentralized system of schools.
I. THE EDUCATION LANDSCAPE OF NEW ORLEANS
A. The Evolution of a System of Schools
The path New Orleans followed to its current system of schools
was uniquely shaped by natural disaster. Before Hurricane Katrina
the OPSB looked like a typical urban district at the time: nearly all
schools were directly operated by the centralized bureaucracy in the
OPSB, there was a smattering of charter schools, and a few failing
schools had been taken over by the state under accountability
measures adopted to comply with the No Child Left Behind Act.23
The OPSB made decisions for all of its schools—ranging from hiring,

(Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-cowen/the-new-orleansexperimen_b_5702778.html (explaining that decentralization has significant costs).
23. Before Katrina there were 117 OPSB schools, 5 RSD schools, and 2
independent charters under BESE. Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans Public Schools
Pre-Katrina and Now, by the Numbers, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 29, 2014,
http://blog.nola.com/education_impact/print.html?entry=/2014/08/new_orleans_publi
c_schools_pre.html; see also Kiel, supra note 17, at 363–65.
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to teacher placement, to curriculum, to purchasing—and the teacher’s
union exerted considerable control.24
While the governance structure was ordinary, the system was
extraordinary for all the wrong reasons. Before Katrina, New
Orleans was one of the worst urban school districts in the nation, and
most of its schools were “academically unacceptable” under state
standards.25 The OPSB was plagued by corruption and financial
mismanagement, with over $265 million in debt and a Federal Bureau
of Investigation task force housed in the district office to root out
graft.26 It was a school district in need of reform.
Hurricane Katrina flooded New Orleans on the second Monday of
the 2005–06 school year. It caused the displacement of 64,000
students and $800 million in damage to public school buildings.27
Fewer than twenty of the 120 school buildings remained useable after
the hurricane. Students, teachers, and administrators were all forced
to evacuate, and the tax base supporting the schools was decimated.28
Days after the storm, the OPSB placed thousands of its teachers on
unpaid leave and fired them three months later.29 The state
legislature moved quickly and amended its accountability laws to
remove 102 of 117 schools from the control of OPSB and place them
24. SARA CARR, HOPE AGAINST HOPE: THREE SCHOOLS, ONE CITY, AND THE
STRUGGLE TO EDUCATE AMERICA’S CHILDREN 77–78 (2013).
25. See Paul Hill & Jane Hannaway, The Future of Public Education in New
Orleans, in AFTER KATRINA: REBUILDING OPPORTUNITY AND EQUITY INTO THE NEW
NEW ORLEANS 27, 28 (Margery Austin Turner & Sheila R. Zedlewski eds., 2006),
available at http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311406_after_katrina.pdf;
Danielle Holley-Walker, The Accountability Cycle: The Recovery School District
Act and New Orleans’ Charter Schools, 40 CONN. L. REV. 125, 127 (2007).
“Academically unacceptable” is a school performance label used by the Louisiana
Department of Education in assessing individual schools and districts. It is based on
a School Performance Score, which is determined by dropout rates, attendance rates,
and standardized exam scores. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:3911–12 (2001).
26. Holley-Walker, supra note 25, at 127; SCOTT S. COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC.,
CREATING A GOVERNING FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS:
SCHOOL DISTRICT POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 9–10 (2009), available at http://www.cowen
institute.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/gov.report1.final_revised.pdf
(detailing
corruption and mismanagement issues in OPSB prior to the storm); UNITED
TEACHERS OF NEW ORLEANS ET AL., ‘NATIONAL MODEL’ OR FLAWED APPROACH?:
THE POST-KATRINA NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 10–11 (2006), available at http://
www.naomiklein.org/files/resources/pdfs/aft-nov-2006.pdf. The financial problems
were so severe that the United States Department of Education threatened to
discontinue educational funding to the entire state. See Oliver v. Orleans Parrish Sch.
Bd., 156 So. 3d 596, 600 (La. 2014).
27. Kathryn G. Newmark & Veronique De Rugy, Hope After Katrina: Will New
Orleans Become the New City of Choice?, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2006, at 14.
28. Hill & Hannaway, supra note 25, at 27.
29. Oliver, 156 So. 3d at 602–03.
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in the hands of the RSD, an arm of the state Department of
Education designed to take over failing schools.30 The RSD
immediately began operating the transferred schools directly, but it
always had the intention of transferring governance to charter school
operators.31
These critical decisions, made quickly after the storm, removed
what many believed to be the two biggest obstacles, historically, to
improving New Orleans’ schools: the OPSB and the teachers’
unions.32 The moves embodied the popular reforms across the
country—state takeover of failing schools (stripping elected boards of
power) and chartering schools (stripping teachers’ unions of power).33
But because of Katrina, it was done faster and more thoroughly in
New Orleans than it had been done in any other city.
Since Katrina, the OPSB has managed the few schools it was left
with—either directly running them or by charter oversight.34 The
RSD also directly ran numerous schools but steadily chartered them
out to private operators.35 The RSD was not prepared for the
monumental task of operating schools in a decimated city, and the
RSD direct run schools quickly became the worst schools in the city
and the dumping ground for the students deemed most difficult to
educate.36
B.

The System of Schools Today

Today there is a confusing patchwork of school governance in New
Orleans.37 As of the 2014–15 school year, there are eighty-three
public schools educating 44,686 students.38 Two bodies loosely govern
these schools: the OPSB, and the Louisiana Board of Elementary and
Secondary Education (BESE) through its administrative arm, the
RSD.39

30. Id.; Layton, supra note 2.
31. CARR, supra note 24, at 17; Layton, supra note 2; Civil Rights Complaint,
supra note 19, at 10–11.
32. Robert A. Garda, Jr., The Politics of Education Reform: Lessons Learned
from New Orleans, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 57, 65 (2011).
33. Id. at 68.
34. SIMS & ROSSMEIER, supra note 16, at 4–6.
35. Id. at 11.
36. CARR, supra note 24; OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 6.
37. Kevin McGill, Hope, Resentment in New Orleans’ Charter School Landscape,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 20, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/hope-resentmentnew-charter-school-landscape.
38. Dreilinger, supra note 23.
39. SIMS & ROSSMEIER, supra note 16, at 4–6.
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As of the 2014–15 school year, the RSD no longer directly operates
any schools.40 Rather, the RSD oversees fifty-six charter schools that
enroll sixty-seven percent of the student population.41 These “Type
5” charter schools, or “RSD charters” as they are known in town, are
pre-existing public schools transferred to the RSD as failing schools
after Katrina and later chartered with BESE.42 These charter schools
are prohibited from using admission requirements and are considered
their own freestanding school districts, or, in technical jargon, local
educational agencies (LEAs).43
LEAs, typically school districts overseeing numerous schools, are
the primary government units responsible for education under state
and federal law. It is the LEA, not individual schools within the
LEA, which bears final responsibility for compliance with most state
and federal laws. The RSD charter schools that are their own oneschool LEAs are treated the same under state and federal law, as are
school districts that usually contain numerous schools, such as the
OPSB.44
BESE directly oversees four charter schools, educating four
percent of the student population.45 These “Type 2” charter schools
enroll students from across the state and are permitted to utilize
admission requirements.46 Like RSD charters, these charter schools
are also independent LEAs.47
OPSB enrolls twenty-eight percent of the student population in six
schools it directly runs and the fourteen charter schools it oversees.48
The OPSB direct-run schools are the only non-charter public schools
in New Orleans. OPSB is the chartering and oversight agency for
Type 1 (startup) and Type 3 (conversion) charter schools.49 These
charter schools are permitted to utilize admission requirements “that

40. Danielle Dreilinger, Recovery School District Downsizes from 568 Employees
to 92, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 5, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/
09/recovery_school_district_downs.html [hereinafter Dreilinger, Recovery School
District Downsizes from 568 Employees to 92].
41. THE COWEN INST., NOLA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 8, at 2.
42. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3973(2)(b)(v) (2013).
43. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3995(H) (2011).
44. See, e.g., Thompson v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574 (8th Cir.
1998); Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Chamberlain Campus v. Smith, 561 F.
Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2008).
45. THE COWEN INST., NOLA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 8, at 2.
46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3973(2)(b)(ii).
47. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3995(H).
48. THE COWEN INST., NOLA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 8, at 2; Dreilinger,
supra note 23.
49. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:3973(2)(b)(i), (ii).
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are consistent with the school’s role, scope and mission . . . .”50 These
schools are not independent LEAs, but instead are part of the OPSB
LEA.51
New Orleans is far and away the most decentralized education
governance system in the United States. There are six traditional
direct-run schools and seventy-six charter schools. Of these seventysix charter schools, sixty-two are LEAs. Put another way, there are
sixty-three independent school districts (including the OPSB) within
the city’s geographic boundaries. Forty-four different school boards
operate these LEAs: the OPSB, BESE (through the RSD), twelve
charter management organizations, and thirty charter boards
overseeing only one school each.52
Compounding this fractured system is the fact that the two entities
with the best ability to plan centrally for the school system—the
OPSB and the RSD—essentially hate one another.53 They often act
more like competitors than governmental entities engaged in the
common goal of educating students. They fight over school quality,
control, facilities, and financing in meetings and the courts.54
To charter and choice proponents, the New Orleans system of
schools is a dream come true. Parents can choose any school in the
city (almost) for their children, allowing the education market to
weed out bad schools and support successful schools, thereby raising
overall quality for all students. Teachers’ unions and large commandand-control bureaucracies are practically gone.55
To charter
opponents, it could not be a worse nightmare. Democratic control
and community have been thrown under the school bus, and the

50. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3991(B)(3) (2011).
51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3995(I). There is also one independent public
school operated under the jurisdiction of the state legislature. THE COWEN INST.,
NOLA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 8, at 2.
52. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 6 (explaining that more than
half the charter schools in the city are run by Charter Management Organizations).
53. Danielle Dreilinger, In Move Towards Cooperation New Orleans’ Two
School Systems Consider Agreement with Millions for Troubled Youth, TIMESPICAYUNE, Mar. 13, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/03/new_
orleans_two_school_systems_2.html [hereinafter Dreilinger, In Move Towards
Cooperation].
54. THE COWEN INST., THE STATE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS 2010
REPORT 30, 36 (2010) [hereinafter THE COWEN INST., 2010 REPORT].
55. See SIMS & ROSSMEIER, supra note 16, at 3; Marta Jewson, Teachers Unions
on the Rise Again in New Orleans, 10 Years After Charters Pushed Them Out,
HECHINGER REP. (Apr. 13, 2015), http://hechingerreport.org/teachers-unions-on-therise-again-in-new-orleans-10-years-after-charters-pushed-them-out/.

2015]

THE VIEW FROM NEW ORLEANS

625

winners are the middle and high-income whites, while the losers are
the vulnerable and historically subordinated student populations.
II. EQUITY IN THE NEW ORLEANS SYSTEM OF SCHOOLS
A decentralized, all-charter school system creates significant
barriers to providing equity, especially to at-risk students such as
English language learners, students with disabilities, poor students,
and minorities. This Part will discuss the treatment of these
marginalized groups, the barriers to achieving equality that inheres in
a system of schools, and the steps that have been taken in New
Orleans, both intentional and unintentional, to address equity.
A. Race and Class Equity
Race was an important subtext in the transformation of the New
Orleans schools after Katrina. While the charter movement views
itself as the new civil rights movement—bringing choice to families
trapped in failing schools—post-Katrina events in New Orleans reveal
why some view the movement as a plot to divest African-Americans
of control of their schools.56 The process by which New Orleans
transformed itself to a system of schools laid the foundation on which
today’s allegations of discrimination are built.
The teaching force—mostly middle class African-American career
teachers—was terminated after Katrina.57 These teachers alleged that
instead of receiving the legally mandated “priority consideration” for
hire in the RSD schools, the state contracted with Teach for America
(TFA) to fill the positions, and TFA’ers displaced much of the old
teaching force.58 The requirement that seventy-five percent of
teachers in a charter school hold valid teaching certificates was
repealed in 2012, further opening the door for an alternatively

56. CARR, supra note 24; see, e.g., Kristen L. Buras, Race, Charter Schools, and
Conscious Capitalism: On the Spatial Politics of Whiteness as Property (and the
Unconscionable Assault on Black New Orleans), 81 HARV. EDUC. REV. 296 (2011).
57. A Louisiana trial court and appellate court ruled that the termination was
wrongful and awarded nearly $1 billion damages, Oliver v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd.,
No. 2005-12244, 2012 WL 2648083, (La. Civ. Dist. Ct. June 20, 2012), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 133 So. 3d 38 (La. Ct. App.), writ granted, 141 So. 3d 274 (La. 2014), but
these decisions were overturned by the Louisiana Supreme Court, Oliver v. Orleans
Parrish Sch. Bd., 156 So. 3d 596, 623 (La. 2014).
58. See Oliver, 156 So. 3d at 622; see also THE COWEN INST., THE STATE OF
PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS: FIVE YEARS AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA 15
(2010) [hereinafter THE COWEN INST., FIVE YEARS AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA];
CARR, supra note 24, at 36–39, 61, 84–85, 118–20 (2013); Buras, supra note 56, at 310;
Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19, at 14–15.
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certified teaching force.59 Today, only fifty-four percent of the
teaching force is minority, and that number is declining.60 The
replacement of the teaching force was seen as “an attack on the city’s
School
black middle class, even if not intended as such.”61
administrators, again mostly African-American pre-Katrina, were
also replaced by non-local whites. The army of TFA’ers has become
so entrenched that they increasingly “run the show” in New Orleans.62
Even charter authorization decisions were taken out of the hands
of the local school board, which were long controlled by AfricanAmericans. Act 235, the key legislation allowing the RSD to take
over the OPSB schools and begin the chartering process, prohibited
districts declared in academic crisis, e.g. New Orleans, from issuing
new charters.63 The Act also mandated that chartering decisions
comply with Standards for Quality School Authorizing promulgated
by the National Alliance of Charter School Authorizers (NACSA)
and required authorizers to utilize independent evaluators such as
NACSA.64 Chartering decisions appeared removed not only from
New Orleanians, but from Louisianans as well. Later, changes were
made to the charter-enabling statute that permitted the state to

59. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, § 2903 (2012); Buras, supra note 56, at 309, 315.
60. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 19. In 2007, TFA predicted
that one in three students in New Orleans would be taught by a TFA teacher. THE
COWEN INST., STATE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS: 2008 REPORT, at 27
(2008) [hereinafter THE COWEN INST., 2008 REPORT]. In the 2007–2008 school year,
sixty percent of the RSD teachers had less than one year of experience, compared to
only ten percent having less than one year of experience before the storm. THE
COWEN INST., 2010 REPORT, supra note 54, at 24; THE COWEN INST., FIVE YEARS
AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 58, at 14. That general trend continues,
though the teacher experience level is gradually increasing. See THE COWEN INST.,
THE STATE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS 2012, at 20–21 (2012); THE
COWEN INST., THE STATE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS 2013, at 15–16
(2013) (“Many schools in New Orleans rely on new teachers recruited through
programs like Teach For America and the New Teacher Project’s teachNOLA.”).
61. CARR, supra note 24, at 121.
62. Id. at 245.
63. 2005 La. Act 35 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:3982(b),
17:3983(2)(a)(ii)). This ban was not lifted until 2011. 2012 Act 2 (codified as
amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:3983(2)); Buras, supra note 56, at 308.
64. 2005 La. Act 35 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
17:3973(2)(b)(v)(aa)); 2009 La. Act 123 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
17:3981(4)); 2006 La. Act 123 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN
17:3992(A)(1)(a); see also LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 126, 28 CXXXIX §§ 303(a)(2),
306(a)(2) (2012).
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certify local charter authorizers other than elected school boards,
further eroding the power of school boards.65
With the African-American controlled OPSB cut-out of the
chartering process, and charter creation and oversight moved to other
entities often controlled by high income whites, such as BESE,
NACSA, or non-profits, it is easy to see how blacks felt entirely
removed from controlling the education of their children. As noted
by Sara Carr—the education reporter for the local paper who wrote a
moving and insightful book about New Orleans education—control
over the schools has passed from “a predominantly black middle class
to a largely affluent white business class.”66
And there is concern that these new leaders are not responsive to
community desires and that parents are disenfranchised.67 When the
charter applications of highly regarded local black educators were
turned down by the state, it only added fuel to the cries of
discrimination.68 This disempowerment creates fertile ground for
critics to view numerous practices as racially discriminatory,
particularly when poor minorities are not proportionately enrolled in
the best schools.
As in any school district across the country, there is a wide
disparity in quality among the schools in New Orleans.69 There is also
a large disparity in student demographics among the schools.
National studies indicate that charter schools nationwide segregate by
race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.70 This segregation exists in
New Orleans, and it appears directly tied to school quality.71

65. 2012 Act 2 (codfied as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:3973(2)(b)(vi),
17:3973(4), 17:3981.1, 3981.2); LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 126 § 403 (2013); Buras, supra
note 56, at 314.
66. CARR, supra note 24, at 66, 197–99; see also Civil Rights Complaint, supra
note 19, at 4–5.
67. Buras, supra note 56, at 300; DeJarnatt, supra note 19; Dreilinger, supra note
18 (telling the story of a neighborhood school that is a case study in how “the
complex, undemocratic state-run school system makes key decisions about what
schools will grow in which neighborhoods—with the community's desires literally tied
for the lowest priority”); Layton, supra note 2; see also Civil Rights Complaint, supra
note 19, at 14 (“Parents have been excluded from the decision-making process to
close schools and have few ways to hold State officials accountable.”).
68. CARR, supra note 24, at 197–98.
69. See id. at 254; Peter Cook, Stop Saying Market-Based Reform. Please,
PETERCOOK.COM (Sept. 2, 2014), http://peterccook.com/2014/09/02/enough-withmarket-based-reform/.
70. See, e.g., ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, CHOICE
WITHOUT EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS STANDARDS 4 (2010), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/
k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/choice-without-equity-2009-report/
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Eighty-five percent of public school students in New Orleans are
eligible for free and reduced lunch (FRL). This is the highest
percentage of students in poverty in any major urban center in the
country.72 These students are not distributed evenly across schools.73
The highest performing schools enroll the fewest FRL students. The
RSD schools have a rate of 95% FRL students, compared to a rate of
68% for OPSB schools.74 The four BESE charter schools enroll an
average of 56% FRL students, and the fourteen OPSB charter
schools (many of which are selective admissions) enroll an average of
61% FRL students.75
The racial compositions of schools are equally lopsided. The youth
population in New Orleans is 73% African-American, but because of
the high rate of privately educated white students, the public school
population is 85% African-American.76 But only 63% of students in
the high performing OPSB charter schools are African-American,
compared to a 96% rate in RSD charters and 95% rate in OPSB
direct-run schools.77 There are only two public schools in the whole of
New Orleans that are representative of the racial composition of New
Orleans’ youth.78
The impact this stratification has on academic outcomes can be
viewed as grossly discriminatory or a huge success story, depending

frankenberg-choices-without-equity-2010.pdf (“[T]he charter sector continues to
stratify students by race, class and possibly language.”); ROSLYN MICKELSON ET AL.,
SCHOOL CHOICE AND SEGREGATION BY RACE, ETHNICITY, CLASS AND
ACHIEVEMENT 1 (2008), available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/CHOICE-08Mickelson-FINAL-EG043008.pdf (“The preponderance of social science research
indicates that students who participate in almost all forms of choice attend schools
that are segregated . . . .”); Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education: School Choice
as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1116 (2014).
71. See Buras, supra note 56, at 320–321.
72. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11; Dreilinger, supra note 23;
Kamenetz, supra note 3.
73. SIMS & VAUGHAN, supra note 13, at 1.
74. Id.; see also CARR, supra note 24; Letter from the Recovery School District to
the Office of Civil Rights 2 (Oct. 8, 2014), http://educatenow.net/wp-content/uploads/
2014/10/RSD_OCR_Letter_10-8-14.pdf.
75. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11; see also CARR, supra
note 24; Letter from the Recovery School District to the Office of Civil Rights, supra
note 74, at 1.
76. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 10; THE COWEN INST.,
NOLA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 8, at 6; Kamenetz, supra note 3.
77. THE COWEN INST., NOLA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 8, at 5; see CARR,
supra note 24, at 280; Letter from the Recovery School District to the Office of Civil
Rights, supra note 74, at 2.
78. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 29; THE COWEN INST.,
NOLA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 8, at 6.
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on how the data is parsed. On the one hand, black students have
made the most gains of any subgroup in New Orleans.79 Before
Katrina, only thirty-two percent of African-American students scored
basic or above on state exams, which was well below the state
average.80 Now, fifty-eight percent score basic or above, which
exceeds the state average for African-Americans.81 In fact, black
students in New Orleans are outperforming their counterparts in
other parts of the state for the first time.82 And the percentage of
black students, and poor students, that attend F-rated schools has
plummeted since Katrina.83 The Center for Research on Education
Outcomes, one of the leading research institutes in evaluating charter
effectiveness, determined that charter schools in New Orleans had a
positive impact for poor and African-American students.84
On the other hand, there is little debate that higher income and
white students disproportionately attend the best schools in New
Orleans, while poor minorities almost exclusively attend the worst
schools.85 The total public school enrollment in New Orleans is seven
percent white,86 but the most successful public schools in New Orleans
have a much higher percentage of white students. Of the seven
highest rated schools, only one has more black students than the
norm—the others are twenty-six to fifty-four percent white.87 At the

79. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 8–9 (“Indeed, the gains made by black students are
the most impressive . . . .”); Cook, supra note 8 (“[L]ow-income and minority
students have been the prime beneficiaries of the improvements in New Orleans
schools.”).
80. Dreilinger, supra note 23.
81. Id.
82. CARR, supra note 24, at 280; Letter from the Recovery School District to the
Office of Civil Rights, supra note 74, at 1.
83. See School Performance Scores Released: 2013–14 Was a Stand Still Year,
supra note 12.
84. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE
IN LOUISIANA 7 (2013); Letter from the Recovery School District to the Office of
Civil Rights, supra note 74, at 4. The methodology and conclusions of the CREDO
study have been questioned by other researchers. See, e.g., Layton, supra note 2;
William J. Mathis & Andrew Maul, New Orleans Charter School Study: Comparing
Incomparables, Repeated Errors, and Small Differences, NAT’L EDUC. POL’Y
CENTER (Aug. 22, 2013), http://nepc.colorado.edu/newsletter/2013/08/review-credo2013-NOLA (“But the evidence provided by the new CREDO study falls well short
of Gov. Jindal’s ‘proof’ of the success of charter schools in either the city or the
state.”).
85. Layton, supra note 2.
86. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
87. Danielle Dreilinger, Civil Rights Complaint Alleges Unequal Treatment for
New Orleans’ Black Public School Students, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 15, 2014,
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other end of the spectrum, only two of the numerous D, F, and
turnaround-rated schools have any white students at all.88 Students in
the higher-income, lower-minority OPSB schools are performing
much better by all measures—ACT scores, graduation rates, end of
course exams, LEAP tests, and college matriculation—than the RSD
charter schools and OPSB direct-run schools.89
Critics of the New Orleans system of schools allege that this
balkanization is due to schools choosing whom they educate, either by
selecting which students to admit or removing students they do not
want.90 But a third, and often-ignored, reason for this racial and
socioeconomic stratification is parent choice.91 Each of these reasons
is discussed next.

1.

Access Equity

One of the biggest challenges since Katrina has been fair and
equitable access to schools. Until 2012, parents had to apply directly
to each separate school, and each school would control its own
lottery, admissions, and wait-lists.92 This presented huge challenges to
both parents and schools. The myriad of school options—RSD
direct-run, OPSB direct-run, RSD charters, OPSB charters, BESE
charters—overwhelmed parents because there was no central location
at which to obtain information.93 Once informed about the schools,
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/05/civil_rights_complaint_alleges.html;
see also Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19, at 16–17.
88. Dreilinger, supra note 87.
89. CARR, supra note 24, at 57; THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at
20–22; Dreilinger, New Orleans High School Exam Results, supra note 8.
90. See, e.g., UNITED TEACHERS OF NEW ORLEANS, LA. FED’N OF TEACHERS &
AM. FED’N OF TEACHERS, ‘NATIONAL MODEL’ OR FLAWED APPROACH?: THE POSTKATRINA NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 10–11 (2006), available at http://
www.naomiklein.org/files/resources/pdfs/aft-nov-2006.pdf; THE INST. ON RACE &
POVERTY, THE STATE OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN POST-KATRINA NEW ORLEANS: THE
CHALLENGE OF CREATING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2010), available at http://
www.irpumn.org/uls/resources/projects/NEW_ORLEANS_FULL_REPORT.pdf;
Jarvis DeBerry, How Good are Schools if Students Can’t Get In?, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Nov. 15, 2009, http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2009/11/how_good_are_
schools_if_studen.html; Bill Quigley, Experimenting on Someone Else’s Children:
Fighting for the Right to Learn in New Orleans, COUNTERPUNCH (Aug. 6, 2007),
http://www.counterpunch.org/quigley08062007.html.
91. Buras, supra note 56, at 307.
92. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 20; THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2,
at 17.
93. Cheryl Bratt et al., N.O. Schools of No Schools?: Absolute Deprivation of

Educational Opportunity in Post-Katrina New Orleans as a Violation of a
Fundamental Right to a Minimally Adequate Education, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
407, 414 (2008); Garda, supra note 32, at 89–90.
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parents had to engage in “a tiring scavenger hunt,” on different
admission dates, and fill out numerous applications with no guarantee
of getting into any school at all, let alone into any particular school.94
Many parents lacked the skills and the time to negotiate several
different registration processes.95 Meaningful school choice during
this period was reserved for well-informed, motivated parents with
the time and resources to navigate the complex information gathering
and registration process.96 Even the state acknowledges, “real choice
did not exist” during this time.97 These enrollment barriers during the
first seven years after Katrina played a major role in the balkanization
of New Orleans schools.
Moreover, charter schools were often accused of massaging their
student populations in a variety of ways during this period.98
Aggressive charters worked to get good students, held early lotteries,
and counseled out families they did not want. These tactics were
successful in a decentralized admission system with little oversight
and almost no transparency.99 It is no surprise that inequities
developed quickly under this free-for-all, eat-what-you kill system of

94. Danielle Dreilinger, Anger, Frustration as Hundreds of New Orleans Parents
Turned Away from Public School Enrollment Center, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 9, 2014,
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/07/hundreds_of_new_orleans_parent.h
tml [hereinafter Dreilinger, Anger, Frustration as Hundreds of New Orleans Parents
Turned Away from Public School Enrollment Center]; see also THE COWEN INST.,
2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 17; Bryant, supra note 10; Layton, supra note 2.
95. JAN RESSEGER, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS IN THE AFTERMATH OF
KATRINA (2007); Bratt et al., supra note 93, at 414.
96. Sarah Carr, School Choice is a Real Test for Parents in New Orleans, TIMESPICAYUNE, Nov. 8, 2009, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2009/11/post_
42.html [hereinafter Carr, School Choice is a Real Test for Parents in New Orleans]
(explaining that parental wherewithal, not geographic location, now determines the
educational destiny of children); Sarah Carr, School Choice Series: Grandmother
Struggles to Navigate System, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 10, 2009, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2009/11/post_44.html; Sarah Carr, School Choice Series: Mother
is Determined to Find Best Public Pre-K, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 10, 2009,
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2009/11/school_choice.html;
Editorial,
Making New Orleans School Choices Easier, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 15, 2009,
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2009/11/making_new_orleans_school_choi.ht
ml; Maxwell, supra note 1; Steve Ritea, Public Schools Compete for Kids: New Array
of Choices Give Parents Power, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 12, 2006, at 1 (“Parents
willing to do their homework researching schools, state and charter officials say, will
end up getting their children into the best ones.”).
97. Letter from the Recovery School District to the Office of Civil Rights, supra
note 74, at 5.
98. Charter schools want to dictate student population. Harden, supra note 2.
99. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 20; THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2,
at 17.
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school enrollment.100 School choice during this period often meant
schools were choosing students, not vice-versa.
In order to make the system easier to navigate for parents and
prevent any gaming of enrollment by schools, the RSD introduced
OneApp for the 2012–13 school year. OneApp allows parents to
apply to nearly every charter school in New Orleans by completing
only one application for each child and to get information on each
charter school in one centralized location.101 In the November before
the upcoming school year, parents list on OneApp their top eight
school choices, in order of preference for each child. The RSD runs a
complex algorithm that attempts to place students at their top choices
and notifies parents of the school selected for their child in April. If
the parent is dissatisfied they can re-apply through a second and third
round of OneApp. If a parent is still dissatisfied with a child’s
placement, or is new to the system and has missed all OneApp
deadlines, he or she can visit a resource center on a first-come, firstserved basis to seek a placement.102 OneApp lists seventy schools
available for the upcoming 2015–16 school year.103
OneApp makes the iconic charter school lottery and waitlists a
thing of the past in New Orleans. Students are simply placed at
schools through the OneApp process. In the 2014–15 school year,
11,000 students filed through OneApp in the first two rounds. Eighty
percent of students in these rounds received one of their top three
choices.104 Overall, OneApp handled 43,000 students.105 Despite the
100. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 20.
101. See Learn About the Process, NEW ORLEANS PUB. SCH. ENROLLMENT,
http://enrollnola.org/how-does-oneapp-work/.
102. Dreilinger, Anger, Frustration as Hundreds of New Orleans Parents Turned
Away from Public School Enrollment Center, supra note 94.
103. Danielle Dreilinger, OneApp Lists More Than 130 New Orleans Public,
Private and Prekindergarten Programs for 2015–16, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 22, 2014,
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/10/oneapp_lists_more_than_130_new.h
tml [hereinafter Dreilinger, OneApp Lists More Than 130 New Programs].
104. Dreilinger, Anger, Frustration as Hundreds of New Orleans Parents Turned
Away from Public School Enrollment Center, supra note 94; Kamenetz, supra note 3;
THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2; Peter Cook, This is NPR: Negatively
Portraying Reform?, PETERCOOK.COM (Aug. 14, 2014), http://peterccook.com/2014/
08/14/this-is-npr/. In 2012, twenty-two percent of parents did not even complete
OneApp, and the state placed these students. Mercedes Schneider, New Orleans
“Parental Choice” and the Walton-Funded OneApp, DEUTSCH29 (July 5, 2013),
http://deutsch29.wordpress.com/2013/07/05/new-orleans-parental-choice-and-thewalton-funded-oneapp/.
105. Daniele Dreilinger, OneApp Serves 5,000 Families in Summer Enrollment,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 14, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/08/
oneapp_serves_5000_families_in.html [hereinafter Dreilinger, OneApp Serves 5,000
Families in Summer Enrollment]. Over seventy percent of students remained
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apparent success of OneApp in placing students to their top choices,
the resource centers set up for parents unhappy with their selection
were overwhelmed this summer with parents seeking to change
schools.106 Over 5000 new or changed placements were made in July
through the OneApp process.107
While the centralization of enrollment through OneApp has solved
many inequities arising from the old enrollment process, it has not
fixed them all. The most obvious problem is that there are not
enough high quality schools to meet the demand. There are 18,500
seats in schools rated A or B, but 45,000 students trying to get those
seats, and the very top schools are far over-enrolled.108 The odds of
getting into one of the highest performing schools are astronomically
small.109 In the words of one parent activist, “[y]ou have a chance, not
a choice.”110 Until the number of high quality schools increases,
demand will necessarily continue to outstrip supply at these top
schools.111
Another continuing barrier to equal access is that not all schools
participate in OneApp.112 The holdouts are the OPSB selective

enrolled in their current school and did not have to complete the OneApp process.
THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
106. Dreilinger, Anger, Frustration as Hundreds of New Orleans Parents Turned
Away from Public School Enrollment Center, supra note 94; Danielle Dreilinger,

Hundreds of New Orleans Parents Try Again at Summer Enrollment Center After
Wednesday Breakdown, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 10, 2014, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2014/07/hundreds_of_new_orleans_parent_1.html;
Kamenetz,
supra note 3.
107. Dreilinger, OneApp Serves 5,000 Families in Summer Enrollment, supra note
105.
108. Kamenetz, supra note 3; see also THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note
2, at 29.
109. Dreilinger, OneApp Serves 5,000 Families in Summer Enrollment, supra note
105.
110. Lyndsey Layton, Are School Closings the ‘New Jim Crow’? Activists File
Civil Rights Complaints, WASH. POST, May 13, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/education/2014/05/13/1a0d3ae8-dab9-11e3-b745-87d39690c5c0_story.html; see
also Kamenetz, supra note 3 (arguing that it is not so much parental choice as it is
taking what is available).
111. In 2012, there were so many poorly performing schools that the RSD fell short
on its attempt to comply with federal policy requiring school districts to offer high
quality alternatives to children in failing schools. See Heather Miller, Parents Have
Few Options When Moving Kids from Failing Public Schools, LENS (Mar. 19, 2013),
http://thelensnola.org/2013/03/19/parents-have-few-options-when-moving-kids-fromfailing-public-schools/.
112. See THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 27; Dreilinger, Anger,

Frustration as Hundreds of New Orleans Parents Turned Away from Public School
Enrollment Center, supra note 94; Dreilinger, OneApp Lists More Than 130 New
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admission schools, discussed below, and the BESE charters—sixteen
schools in 2014 that will decrease to ten schools in 2015.113 Most of
the New Orleans A- and B-ranked schools still require their own
admission applications, deadlines, and procedures.114 Parents hoping
to get their children into these schools need to engage in the timeconsuming scavenger hunt for schools and applications, meaning
“[o]nly parents with the means to go through multiple, individual
admission processes have access to those schools.”115 Recognizing this
problem, the Louisiana Department of Education is attempting to
require all schools to participate in OneApp upon each charter’s
renewal, though this may be as far as a decade away for some
schools.116
Schools utilizing selective admissions also hinder equitable access.
Many of the OPSB schools—by far the best public schools in the
city—were magnet schools before the storm; the state transformed
them into charter schools that utilize selective admissions criteria,
such as performance on standardized tests and grades.117 These
schools have been a longstanding source of contention in New
Orleans even before the storm.118 The controversy became more
pronounced after Katrina because RSD charter schools are

Programs, supra note 103; Dreilinger, OneApp Serves 5,000 Families in Summer
Enrollment, supra note 105.
113. See SIMS & ROSSMEIER, supra note 16, at 16–17; see also THE COWEN INST.,
2008 REPORT, supra note 60, at 15; THE COWEN INST., FIVE YEARS AFTER
HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 58, at 21; Carr, School Choice is a Real Test for
Parents in New Orleans, supra note 96; Carr, School Choice Series: Mother is
Determined to Find Best Public Pre-K, supra note 96.
114. See Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19, at 16; Cook, supra note 8; Letter
from the Recovery School District to the Office of Civil Rights, supra note 74, at 5.
115. Letter from the Recovery School District to the Office of Civil Rights, supra
note 74, at 5; see also Schneider, supra note 104.
116. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 4; Cook, supra note 8; see
also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 2709(K) (2014) (making OneApp mandatory for type
2, 4, 5, and 1b charter schools only).
117. See THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 18; Garda, supra note
32, at 67–69, 77; Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19, at 16–17 (noting that six
schools currently utilize foreign language or academic admission criteria). The Office
of Civil Rights launched an investigation into whether OPSB admission policies are
racially discriminatory, particularly at selective admission schools. Sarah Carr, Feds

Investigating Racial Discrimination Complaint Involving Some Orleans Charter
Schools, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/
2010/01/post_73.html.
118. Other parts of the country cite selective admission charter schools for racial
and socioeconomic segregation as well. See, e.g., Complaint to Office of Civil Rights
at 3–5, 17–18, ACLU Found. of Del. v. Delaware & Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist.
(Dec. 3, 2014), available at http://www.aclu-de.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/
ACLU-et-al-v.-State-of-Delaware-and-Red-Clay-Consolidated-03-Dec-14.pdf.
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prohibited from utilizing selective academic admissions.119 But any
chance that academic selective admission criteria would be abolished
was put to rest in 2012 when the legislature grandfathered the practice
of selective admission schools based on academic performance.120
Equity concerns over access will persist as long as admission
barriers prevent some students from even being eligible to apply to
the highest performing schools. The perception of poor AfricanAmericans is that selective admission schools are reserved for more
advantaged children, and that perception appears correct.121 The
mere existence of selective admission schools that have a much higher
proportion of whites than other schools confirms racial stratification
to many black New Orleanians.122 Even John White, the state
Superintendent and staunch supporter of charter schools and the New
Orleans system of schools, agrees that exempting selective admission
schools from OneApp creates access inequity.123
The use of neighborhood preferences also inhibits fair and open
access.124
Charter schools are accused of controlling student
demographics by including a preference in their admissions for
students residing in the neighborhood. The OPSB schools have
always been permitted to use neighborhood preferences and the
legislature expressly permitted neighborhood preferences in RSD
charter school admissions in 2010.125 Neighborhood preferences could
certainly be used as a tool of inclusion rather than exclusion, but that
has not been the case in New Orleans. According to a recent civil
rights complaint filed with the Department of Justice and the

119. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3991(B)(1)(d) (2011); Carr, School Choice is a
Real Test for Parents in New Orleans, supra note 96. No other state permits charter
schools to utilize selective admission criteria. Sarah Carr, National Charter Advocate
Says He’s Opposed to Selective Admissions During Talk in New Orleans, TIMESPICAYUNE,
Sept.
11,
2009,
http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2009/09/national_charter_advocate_spea.html.
120. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3991; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 2705(B)
(2014).
121. See Maxwell, supra note 1; Schneider, supra note 104.
122. Amy Waldman, Reading, Writing, Resurrection, ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2007,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/reading-writingresurrection/305560/.
123. Layton, supra note 2.
124. See THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3991(B)(4)(b); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, §3973(2)(a) (2013); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 2701(E) (2014); Andrew
Vanacore, Some New Orleans Charter Schools Allowed to Save Spots for
TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Apr.
8,
2011,
Neighborhood
Students,
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2011/04/some_new_orleans_charter_schoo.h
tml.
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Department of Education, discussed in detail below, “[t]he two
schools in New Orleans that give preference to students living in
surrounding neighborhoods are located in mostly White, middle class
communities.”126
Finally, student demographics can be manipulated by giving
students in school-run, fee-based preschools preference in
kindergarten admissions.127 This practice ensures that a significant
number of entering kindergarteners are middle- and high-income
students. The use of preferences for students in the school’s prekindergarten program means there are fewer open seats in many
kindergarten programs, and the odds of getting into a school after
The Louisiana Department of
kindergarten become lower.128
Education, recognizing the troubling aspects of this practice, changed
its regulations to permit lottery exemptions for children in prekindergarten programs that were provided free of charge. It also
permitted charter schools that charge tuition for their preschool
program to seek approval from the charter authorizer to exempt
these students from the lottery for admission to kindergarten. “In
such a case, the [authorizer] shall require the charter school to set
enrollment targets that ensure the charter school provides equity of
access for at-risk applicants to its kindergarten classes.”129 Put simply,
charter schools can still manipulate student demographics by using a

126. Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19, at 7, 17, 22–23; see also Type 3 Charter
School Operating Agreement Between Hynes Charter School Corporation and The
Orleans Parish School Board (2011), available at http://www.opsb.us/wp-content/
uploads/2012/10/2011-Executed-Operating-Agreement-Hynes.pdf
(allowing
neighborhood preferences); Type 3 Charter School Operating Agreement Between
Advocates For Arts-Based Education Corporation and The Orleans Parish School
Board (2011), available at http://www.opsb.us/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2011Executed-Operating-Agreement-Lusher.pdf. No RSD charter has chosen to utilize
neighborhood preferences. THE COWEN INST., CASE STUDIES OF SCHOOL CHOICE
AND OPEN ENROLLMENT IN FOUR CITIES 4 (2011), available at http://www.cowen
institute.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Intro-New-Orleans-Case-Study-112011.pdf.
127. BARBARA FERGUSON & KARRAN HARPER ROYAL, THE DECEPTION OF THE
“LOTTERY” AT LYCEE FRANCAIS AND AUDUBON SCHOOLS: THE MISUSE OF CHARTER
SCHOOLS—PART
II
1
(2011),
available
at
http://www.researchonreforms.org/html/documents/DeceptionoftheLottery.pdf. But
see Robert Morris, French-Immersion Charter Schools Dispute Allegation that Their
Admissions Favor the Wealthy, UPTOWN MESSENGER (Nov. 19, 2011),
http://uptownmessenger.com/2011/11/audubon-charter-school-november-boardmeeting/ (defending the practice).
128. Dreilinger, OneApp Serves 5,000 Families in Summer Enrollment, supra note
105.
129. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, §2711(B) (2014).
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preference for their tuition paying preschool students, but the
practice must be approved and is somewhat circumscribed.
These continuing barriers to equitable access led local and national
organizations to file a complaint alleging discriminatory educational
practices in violation of Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act with
the Department of Justice and the Office of Civil Rights in May of
2014.130 It contains two claims: (1) African-American students are
subject to school closures at a much higher rate than white students;
and (2) the state discriminates against African-American students by
failing to provide adequate educational alternatives for students in
recently closed schools.131 The allegation is essentially that the RSD
closes traditional, direct-run schools that are almost one hundred
percent African-American at much higher rates than similarly
performing schools with high percentages of white students.132 It then
discriminates, according to the Complaint, against the AfricanAmerican students from the closed schools “by implementing a
confusing and biased enrollment system and by blindly allowing
charter and OPSB public schools to institute admissions
criteria . . . that disproportionately affect and exclude AfricanAmerican students.”133 The Complaint asked the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to prevent the closing of the last five RSD direct-run
schools and to put a moratorium on charter renewals, neither of
which happened.134
While the state considered the Complaint “a joke” and political
maneuvering by teachers’ unions,135 the DOJ has opened an
investigation, and the RSD has officially responded to the
Complaint.136 It is highly unlikely that the DOJ will find any civil

130. See Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19. Simultaneous complaints, with
similar allegations, were filed in New Orleans, Chicago, and Newark—all school
systems systematically closing schools and chartering them to private operators. See
Dreilinger, New Orleans Charter Civil Rights Complaint ‘a Joke’, supra note 8.
131. Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19, at 21–23.
132. Id. at 21–22.
133. Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19, at 7; see also id. at 22–23.
134. Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19, at 24; Dreilinger, New Orleans Charter
Civil Rights Complaint ‘a Joke’, supra note 8.
135. Dreilinger, New Orleans Charter Civil Rights Complaint ‘a Joke’, supra note
8.
136. Danielle Dreilinger, U.S. Education Department Opens Civil Rights
Investigation of New Orleans Public School Closures, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 24,
2014,
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/09/us_education_department_
opens.html [hereinafter Dreilinger, U.S. Education Department Opens Civil Rights
Investigation of New Orleans Public School Closures]; see also Letter from the
Recovery School District to the Office of Civil Rights, supra note 74, at 5.
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rights violations in the school closing and OneApp process.137 A
federal district court recently rejected similar claims of discrimination
based on school closures in Washington, D.C.138 It held:
Few topics, understandably, incite our passions more than the
education of our children. Toss into the mix the future of
neighborhood institutions, whose familiarity and history may
resonate deeply, and quite a volatile brew emerges. It is thus hardly
surprising that assorted constituencies may possess varied opinions
on the wisdom and necessity of the Plan and . . . strategy. Yet every
adverse policy decision does not yield a constitutional claim. In this
case, there is no evidence whatsoever of any intent to discriminate
on the part of Defendants, who are actually transferring children out
of weaker, more segregated, and under-enrolled schools. The
remedy Plaintiffs seek—i.e., to remain in such schools—seems
curious, given that these are the conditions most people typically
endeavor to escape.139

But the fact that the admissions process continues to produce
skewed school demographics that are directly tied to school quality,
combined with the racially charged history of post-Katrina school
reform, means that allegations of access inequality will persist.
In sum, for seven years after Katrina, access to schools was a
decentralized, uncoordinated, logistical nightmare for parents. This
significantly contributed to the balkanization of the schools by race,
socioeconomic status, and academic ability, because the most
motivated and able parents were able to secure favorable placements
for their children, leaving parents without resources or time for the
dregs of the system. And with little to no oversight, charter schools
were able to massage student enrollments through a variety of
practices. It is no surprise that during this time fewer poor AfricanAmerican parents believed their children were enrolled in their first
choice schools than did white parents.140
It was only in year eight, through a concerted and coordinated
effort to centralize admissions through OneApp, that many of these
Without this
problems were addressed, if not yet solved.141

137. OCR has resolved forty-two of seventy-six complaints alleging racially
discriminatory changes but has required systemic changes in only one case.
Dreilinger, U.S. Education Department Opens Civil Rights Investigation of New
Orleans Public School Closures, supra note 136.
138. Smith v. Henderson, 944 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D.D.C. 2013).
139. Id. at 93.
140. See THE COWEN INST., 2008 REPORT, supra note 60, at 15.
141. Louisiana law also permits charter schools with corporate sponsors to reserve
half of their seats for the children of employees of the corporate sponsor. See LA.
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centralization, the schools would certainly be even more stratified by
race, socioeconomic status, and ability. A critical lesson from New
Orleans is that equal access demands a unified enrollment process
overseen by a centralized authority. The system is far from perfect—
circumscribing opportunities for students based on their place of
residence, academic abilities, or capacity to pay for preschool can
never achieve access equity or claim to be truly a free choice
system142—but it is a vast improvement over the previous
decentralized system of enrollment.

2.

Retention Equity

A common complaint against charter schools nationwide is that
they utilize suspension and expulsion to push out students who are
difficult to educate.143 Enrolling at-risk and difficult students with bad
behavior is risky for charter schools, whose very survival depends on
high test scores and graduation rates.144 One easy way to solve this
problem is to cull these challenging students from their student bodies
through suspension or expulsion. To this point, a nationwide study
found that charter schools had overly harsh discipline policies.145 This
is certainly true in New Orleans, where many charter schools have
adopted strict behavior policies with drastic consequences.146 During

REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 3991(1). No school has taken advantage of this lottery
preference.
142. Aaron Saiger, What We Disagree About When We Disagree About School
Choice, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULLETIN 49, 54 (2014).
143. See ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
CHARTER SCHOOLS: STANDARDS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE
OVERSIGHT 8 (2014), available at http://annenberginstitute.org/sites/default/files/
CharterAccountabilityStds.pdf; see also Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah & Alex Richards,

CPS: Expulsion Rate Higher at Charter Schools: Disparity Sure to Become Fuel in
Ongoing Education Debate, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 26, 2014), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2014-02-26/news/ct-chicago-schools-discipline-met-20140226_1_
charter-schools-andrew-broy-district-run-schools; Preston C. Green et al., Having It

Both Ways: How Charter Schools Try to Obtain Funding of Public Schools and the
Autonomy of Private Schools, 63 EMORY L.J. 303, 335 (2013); Harden, supra note 2.
But see Jaclyn Zubrzycki et al., Charter Schools’ Discipline Policies Face Scrutiny,
EDUC. WK. (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2013/02/20/
21charters_ep.h32.html (explaining that the expulsion rate for charter schools was
generally similar to that of traditional public schools, which was one student in five
hundred).
144. See CARR, supra note 24, at 235.
145. ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, supra note 143, at 3.
146. Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans Schools Expel More Students, but Are
More Accountable, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 24, 2013, http://www.nola.com/education/
index.ssf/2013/08/post_197.html [hereinafter Dreilinger, New Orleans Schools Expel
More Students]; Andrew Vanacore, Recovery School District to List Behaviors That
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the first seven years after Katrina, students were routinely expelled
for minor offenses, such as uniform violations or carrying a cigarette
lighter, and provided little to no due process.147 This led to a high
attrition rate in New Orleans schools, as many schools suspended,
expelled, or transferred tough students, though precise data was hard
to collect because there was no centralized student tracking.148
The problem became so acute that students staged sit-ins and
protests at several schools, challenging their harsh suspension and
expulsion practices.149 The dissatisfaction culminated in students,
parents, and advocates filing a complaint with the Louisiana
Department of Education, the Office of Civil Rights, and the
Department of Justice in April of 2014, alleging that certain schools
are “based on a harsh and punitive discipline culture . . . [that]
endanger[s] the safety and welfare of students, violates students’
rights under state and federal laws [and] push[es] students out of
school for minor infractions . . . .”150 Suspension rates in the named
schools ranged from thirty-eight to sixty-eight percent.151 The state
has placed on hold the investigation of the Complaint.152

Could Get Students Expelled, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 16, 2012, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2012/07/recovery_school_district_lists_1.html.
147. Dreilinger, New Orleans Schools Expel More Students, supra note 146; see
also Meredith Simons, The Student Led Backlash Against New Orleans’s Charter
Schools, ATLANTIC (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/
2014/02/the-student-led-backlash-against-new-orleanss-charter-schools/283597;
Vanacore, supra note 146.
148. See CARR, supra note 24, at 159–61, 189, 263; Dreilinger, New Orleans
Schools Expel More Students, supra note 146; see also Civil Rights Complaint, supra
note 19, at 17.
149. See, e.g., Garry Boulard, First All-Charter System Set to Debut in New
Orleans, NEW ORLEANS CITY BUS. (Aug. 1, 2014) (discussing sit-in student protests in
November 2013 at FirstLine for suspension and expulsion policies); Danielle
Dreilinger, State Investigation of N.O.’s Collegiate Academies Charters on Hold
Pending
Further
Documentation,
TIMES-PICAYUNE,
May
15,
2014,
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/05/state_investigation_of_new_orl.htm
l [hereinafter Dreilinger, State Investigation of N.O.’s Collegiate Academies Charters
on Hold Pending Further Documentation] (describing protests at Sci Academy
regarding suspension policies); Simons, supra note 147.
150. Administrative Complaint Requesting Investigations into Three New Orleans
Charter Schools Operated by Collegiate Academies—George Washington Carver
Preparatory Academy, George Washington Carver Collegiate Academy, and Sci
Academy
[hereinafter
Carver
Complaint],
available
at
http://media.nola.com/education_impact/other/4.15.2014%20Carver%20Complaint%
20For%20Release.pdf.
151. Id. at 4; see also Kamenetz, supra note 3.
152. Dreilinger, State Investigation of N.O.’s Collegiate Academies Charters on
Hold Pending Further Documentation, supra note 149.
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The Complaint is an attack on the foundations of “no excuses”
schools—behavior modification training and zero tolerance.153 The
ready defense of schools is that they are entitled to determine which
offenses should be punishable, and that if parents do not like it, they
can choose a school with less strict codes of conduct.154 This
exemplifies the current state of education in New Orleans—if you
don’t like a particular practice, simply choose another school. The
full range of schools exists, according to this theory, which permits
parents who approve of tough discipline to select these schools and
the parents who oppose harsh discipline to select other schools.
Charter advocates take the position that parent choice, not school
practice, is the primary form of accountability in a system of
schools.155
New Orleans has only partially embraced this ideology when it
comes to suspension and expulsion. In 2012, the RSD created a
centralized expulsion review board to prevent the alleged pushing out
of unwanted students.156 All RSD schools and OPSB direct-run
schools now utilize the same expulsion policies and procedures that
are processed through the RSD Student Hearing Office.157 The RSD
also created a unified list of expellable offenses that RSD charter
schools must follow, thus ensuring that minor offenses would not lead
to expulsion.158 All RSD schools and OPSB direct-run schools must
utilize this policy, while OPSB charter schools are exempt from its
guidelines.159 This was a rare instance of cooperation between the
153. See generally CARR, supra note 24 (describing the “no excuses” behavior
model that is foundational at Sci Academy). Sci Academy is one of the schools
identified in the Complaint. See Carver Complaint, supra note 150; see also Sarah
Carr, How Strict is Too Strict: The Backlash Against No-Excuses Discipline in High
School, ATLANTIC, Dec. 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/12/
how-strict-is-too-strict/382228 [hereinafter Carr, How Strict is Too Strict}.
154. See, e.g., Linda Lutton, Chicago Charter Schools Struggle to Hold onto
Weakest Students, WBEZ.COM (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.wbez.org/story/news/
education/charters-struggle-hold-their-weakest-students.
155. The complainants contemplated precisely this argument in their complaint,
alleging that “[t]he students at these schools . . . are not really empowered to be able
to change schools.” Carver Complaint, supra note 150, at 10.
156. See Kamenetz, supra note 3.
157. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 4. OPSB charter schools do
not have to use the RSD Student Hearing Office. Id. at 5.
158. RECOVERY SCH. DISTRICT, EXPULSION PROCESS AND PROCEDURES—2012–
2013 SCHOOL YEAR, available at http://rsdschoolperformance.files.wordpress.com/
2012/08/rsd-expulsion-process-and-standards-2012-13.pdf; see also RECOVERY SCH.
DISTRICT, RSD STUDENT EXPULSION PROCESS AND PROCEDURES, available at
http://www.boarddocs.com/la/bese/Board.nsf/files/8SYMQ75924D6/$file/Bulletin%20
129%20Hearing%20Office%20backup.pdf.
159. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
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RSD and the OPSB, and it shows the evolution of the RSD from
granting complete autonomy to its charter schools to now retaining
some centralized control over policies and practices.160
But the OPSB and the RSD still refuse to control all aspects of
student retention, as there are no plans to centralize suspension
policies and practices. The line is drawn between suspension and
expulsion, according to the RSD, because expulsions affect the entire
school system whereas suspensions do not, and charter schools need
to retain autonomy over internal discipline.161 Of course suspensions
can be long enough to have the same deleterious effect as expulsions
for students.162 This is a real danger in a city that has an “absurd” rate
of suspensions: one quarter of schools have suspended more than
twenty percent of their students in a school year.163 The centralized
expulsion system is not perfect, as schools still counsel-out difficult
students, but “ever since the city started a centralized expulsion
system last fall, more students are being formally expelled, rather
than informally ejected.”164 Despite the shortcomings, the
centralization of expulsion policy and hearings is certainly better than
leaving these decisions in the hands of autonomous school operators,
and it is being mimicked by several cities with large charter school
sectors.165
The RSD and the OPSB also worked together to ensure a quality
alternative placement while students were serving their expulsions.166
In a traditional school district made predominately of schools run
directly by the school board with only a couple of charter schools, the
direct-run schools often end up as the repositories for expelled
students. This was certainly the case in New Orleans when the RSD
was running schools directly between 2006 and 2013. The RSD
direct-run schools became the dumping grounds for the unruly and

160. Dreilinger, New Orleans Schools Expel More Students, supra note 146;
Vanacore, supra note 146.
161. Dreilinger, New Orleans Schools Expel More Students, supra note 146.
162. Id.
163. See JUVENILE JUSTICE PROJECT OF LA., SUSPENSIONS MATTER: BY THE
NUMBERS 2012–2013 (2014), available at http://jjpl.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2013/
03/Suspensions-Matter.1213bythenumbers.pdf; see also Carr, How Strict is Too
Strict, supra note 153.
164. Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans Alternative School Suggests Neighboring
School Improve Security, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 6, 2013, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2013/12/new_orleans_alternative_school.html; Dreilinger, New
Orleans Schools Expel More Students, supra note 146.
165. Dreilinger, New Orleans Schools Expel More Students, supra note 146.
166. Id.
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difficult students that had been kicked out of charter schools.167
Knowing that there would be no more direct-run schools, the RSD
and OPSB created the Crescent Leadership Academy—a special
charter school that would cater to suspended and expelled students.168
The solution to preventing schools from massaging enrollments
through student retention policies was the same solution to achieving
equitable access: centralization of services and unification of
policies.169 And just as OneApp does not apply to all schools (OPSB)
or all practices (selective admissions), the centralized expulsion
hearings and unified expulsion rules do not apply to all schools or to
any school’s suspensions.170 Unification and centralization in access
and retention policies push up against political and autonomy
barriers.
The
tension
between
centralization
and
specialization/autonomy is a recurring theme in the quest for
retention equality in the New Orleans system of schools.

3.

Choice

Much more is at work than just admission and retention policies
leading to racially and socioeconomically skewed school enrollments.
What is often ignored in this discussion is that many schools are
designed for poor and minority students. For example, Knowledge is
Power Program (KIPP) schools, of which there are ten in New
Orleans, were founded on the belief that demographically challenging
students could be educated in a segregated environment.171 These

167. See OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 5–6; CARR, supra note 24; see also Garda,
supra note 32, at 78.
168. Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans School for Expelled Students Makes
Changes for 2014–15, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 24, 2014, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2014/09/new_orleans_school_for_expelle.html.
169. The state is also attempting to prevent unwarranted suspensions and
expulsions through the chartering process. The charter-enabling statute was
amended in 2010 to ensure that charter applicants include a “master plan for
improving behavior and discipline” that incorporates restorative justice and positive
behavior interventions. 2010 Act 756 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17:3981(4), 17:3982(A)(1)(a)(i), 17:3983(A)(3)(c), 17:3991(B)(14)) (requiring that
each charter proposal be approved only if it includes “discipline practices and policies
that incorporate positive behavior interventions and supports, restorative justice, and
other research-based discipline practices and classroom management strategies . . . ”);
see also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 126 §§ 306(A), 701(B) (2012).
170. Dreilinger, New Orleans Schools Expel More Students, supra note 146.
171. Frequently Asked Questions, KIPP, http://www.kipp.org/faq (last visited Mar.
15, 2015); Michaela Krauser, Dealing with Segregation in Urban U.S. Schools, NEXT
CITY (July 10, 2012), http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/dealing-with-segregation-inurban-us-schools; Nina Rees, KIPP Leads the Way: The Charter Network Turns 20
This Week, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 29, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/
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schools accept the fact that racial and socioeconomic isolation exist—
indeed public schools are more segregated by race than at the time of
Brown172—and implement a curriculum and methodology designed to
provide a high level education to these demographically challenging
students in their racially and socioeconomically isolated schools.173
The “no excuses” model of education174 created by KIPP, and popular
in many other New Orleans charter schools,175 appeals to many
African-American students but is a turn-off to middle and upper class
white parents.176 “Because many choice schools seek to serve a
particular population, their designs influence [racial and
socioeconomic] demographics.”177 Sci Academy—one of the schools
with the harshest discipline policies and a strict “no excuses”
approach—is the third most popular school in the city for ninth

opinion/blogs/nina-rees/2014/07/29/kipp-celebrates-20-years-of-educating-minorityand-low-income-students.
172. Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Schools More Separate and Unequal: Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2014 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 633 (2014); James, supra note 70, at 1088.
173. Matthew Yglesias, Charter Schools and Low-SES Students: Damned if They
Do and Damned if They Don’t?, THINKPROGRESS (June 2, 2011),
http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/2011/06/02/234962/charter-schools-and-low-sesstudents-damned-if-they-do-and-damned-if-they-don%E2%80%99t/ (“We should
think of these kind of schools as stopgaps, workable solutions to the difficult problem
of running a school in an environment of concentrated poverty. . . . But given that
concentrated poverty isn’t going to vanish next week, we should also be applauding
people who are finding ways to make it work.”). Many believe the charter movement
was founded on educating failing at-risk students. See, e.g., Carr, How Strict is Too
Strict, supra note 153; Schneider, supra note 104.
174. For an explanation of the “no-excuses” charter school pedagogy, see Valerie
Strauss, Why ‘No Excuses’ Charter Schools Mold ‘Very Submissive’ Students—
Starting in Kindergarten, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2014/09/19/why-no-excuses-charter-schools-mold-verysubmissive-students-starting-in-kindergarten/; The No-Excuses Charter School
Movement, DEWEY TO DELPIT, http://edcommentary.blogspot.com/p/no-excusescharter-movement.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
175. Carr, How Strict is Too Strict, supra note 153; Simons, supra note 147;
Vanacore, supra note 146; Eric Westervelt, A New Orleans Charter School Marches
to Its Own Tune, NPR ED (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ed/2014/10/13/
354090391/a-new-orleans-charter-school-marches-to-its-own-tune.
176. CARR, supra note 24, at 102–04; Carr, How Strict is Too Strict, supra note 153
(“[L]ow-income parents as a group tend toward a firmly directive approach with their
children, whereas middle-class parents typically favor a more solicitous tack . . . .”);
Richard Kahlenberg, Low-Income Students and KIPP Charter Schools, WASH. POST,
June 7, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/low-incomestudents-and-kipp-charter-schools/2011/06/06/AGquWhKH_blog.html;
Yglesias,
supra note 173.
177. MICKELSON ET AL., supra note 70, at 10.
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graders.178 The New Orleans system of specialized schools allows
parents to choose segregation, and many parents are making this
choice.
In addition, the uncomfortable truth may be that the old proverb
“birds of a feather flock together” is correct:
[Nationwide e]thnic self-segregation is evident among many charter
school populations. These trends are not due to white flight from
charters, but to white, black, Native American, and Latino parents
who choose schools based more on their racial composition than on
the relative academic quality of the charter school. Parents often
seek charter schools with a majority of students from their own race,
schools that often have lower test scores than the school their
children exit.179

Whites choose to remain in schools with a majority of whites180—it
is no surprise that minorities would choose to do the same.
The parents provide the demand while foundation funding ensures
an adequate supply of specialized schools focused on the poor and
minorities. The large influx of foundation money to New Orleans
charter schools creates incentives to keep schools socioeconomically
segregated because the foundations are reticent to give money to
schools with significant populations of middle- and high-income
students.181 In the New Orleans school market, the supply of “no

178. Neerav Kingsland, The Connection Between Choice and Humility, EDUC.
NEXT (Feb. 13, 2014), http://educationnext.org/the-connection-between-choice-andhumility/.
179. MICKELSON ET AL., supra note 70, at 10; see also Robert Bifulco & Helen F.
Ladd, School Choice, Racial Segregation, and Test-score Gaps: Evidence from North
Carolina’s Charter School Program, 26 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 31 (2007); David
R. Garcia, Charter Schools Challenging Traditional Notions of Segregation, in THE
CHARTER SCHOOL EXPERIMENT: EXPECTATIONS, EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 33
(Christopher A. Lubienski & Peter C. Weitzel eds., 2010); James, supra note 70, at
1104–05; Kelly E. Rapp & Suzanne E. Eckes, Dispelling the Myth of “White Flight”:
An Examination of Minority Enrollment in Charter Schools, 21 EDUC. POL’Y 615
(2007); Linda A. Renzulli & Lorraine Evans, School Choice, Charter Schools and
White Flight, 52 SOC. PROBS. 398 (2005); Salvatore Saporito, Private Choices, Public
Consequences: Magnet School Choice and Segregation by Race and Poverty, 50 SOC.
PROBS. 181 (2003); Gregory R. Weiher & Kent L. Tedin, Does Choice Lead to
Racially Distinctive Schools? Charter Schools and Household Preferences, 21 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 79 (2002); Kevin Booker et al., The Effect of Charter
Schools on School Peer Composition (RAND Education, Working Paper No. 306,
2005).
180. See Robert A. Garda, Jr., The White Interest in School Integration, 63 FLA. L.
REV. 599, 614–15 (2011).
181. CARR, supra note 24, at 103–04. New Orleans charter schools receive tens of
millions of dollars from private organizations. Kamenetz, supra note 3.
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excuses” schools is fostered by private donations, while the demand is
primarily from black and low-income parents.182
It is impossible to ignore that school design and parent choice play
a large role in the racial and socioeconomic disparity among
schools.183 The inherent nature of an all-choice system of schools
permits, if not exacerbates, segregation because it “facilitate[s]
parents’ ability to dissent not just in word but in action against
integration.”184 As Professor Osamudia Jones puts it,
A turn to affinity charters or charter schools that are increasingly
segregated may be the embrace of racial isolation as a virtue rather
than a vice . . . . School choice plans only compound the de facto
segregation that makes American public schools more segregated
now than they were at the time of Brown v. Board of Education.185

B.

Equity for Students with Disabilities

Charter schools nationwide are accused of not properly educating
students with disabilities.186 They have long been blamed for denying
admission to students with disabilities, “cherry-picking” students with
mild disabilities, providing a one-size-fits-all program instead of a full
continuum of placements, failing to follow proper disciplinary
procedures, and failing to identify students as disabled.187 These
accusations are particularly strong in New Orleans.188
There are numerous stories of students with disabilities being
denied admission to charter schools or being “counseled out”—

182. See supra notes 176–78, 181.
183. Derek Black, Charter Schools, Vouchers, and the Public Good, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 101, 124 (2013); Weiher & Tedin, supra note 179.
184. Black, supra note 183, at 120; see also Nick Lewin, The No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001: The Triumph of School Choice Over Racial Desegregation, 12 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 95, 113 (“Multiple studies indicate that unregulated public
school choice threatens to actually increase segregation.”).
185. James, supra note 70, at 1117.
186. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-543, CHARTER SCHOOLS:
ADDITIONAL FEDERAL ATTENTION NEEDED TO HELP PROTECT ACCESS FOR
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 6–7, 11–13 (2012); ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH.
REFORM, supra note 143, at 7 (explaining that there is widespread use “of explicit or
subtle barriers to enrollment” around the country); Robert A. Garda, Jr., Culture
Clash: Special Education in Charter Schools, 90 N.C. L. REV. 655, 681–93 (2012)
[hereinafter Garda, Special Education in Charter Schools].
187. ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, supra note 143, at 7; MICKELSON ET AL.,
supra note 70; Garda, Special Education in Charter Schools, supra note 186, at 129.
188. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 4; Heilman, supra note 20, at
360–67.
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convinced that the charter school could not serve their needs.189
These practices are clear violations of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), and the
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA).190 The data
corroborates the anecdotal evidence. In 2010, charter schools
educated sixty percent of the public school students in New Orleans,
but enrolled only thirty-eight percent of the students with autism,
thirty-seven percent of the students with severe emotional
disturbances, and twenty-three percent of the students with multiple
disabilities.191 Most of the students with disabilities were in the RSD
direct-run schools, which were the “schools of last resort” and worst
performing schools in the city.192 Even with the elimination of RSD
direct-run schools, special education enrollment across school types
continues to vary widely. The student populations in the BESE and
OPSB charter schools—the highest performers in the city—include
only between three to five percent of special education students, well
below the city average. Every school rated A by the state has below
average special education enrollments.193 The RSD charter schools—
most of which were formerly run directly by the RSD—enroll 9.4%
special education students, the same as the citywide average.194
There are several explanations for why charter schools turn away
students with disabilities. First is the pressure to produce results on
standardized tests in order to maintain the charter. Accountability
requirements create strong incentives to deny admission to these
lower performing students.195 Second, the high costs of educating
students with disabilities also provide a strong incentive to deny

189. CARR, supra note 24, at 139; Heilman, supra note 20, at 362–67; Garda, Special
Education in Charter Schools, supra note 186, at 683–84.
190. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012); Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400–1482 (2012). For discussion of the applicability of these statutes to charter
schools in general, see Jay P. Heubert, Schools Without Rules? Charter Schools,
Federal Disability Law, and the Paradoxes of Deregulation, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 301, 303, 315, 343–45 (1997); CATHERINE E. LHAMON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: SCHOOL ENROLLMENT PROCEDURES (2014),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201405.pdf
(explaining that the U.S. Department of Education has made clear that charter
schools must accept and provide English Language Learner and special education
services).
191. CARR, supra note 24, at 130.
192. CARR, supra note 24, at 139; Heilman, supra note 20, at 363–65.
193. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 12.
194. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 10.
195. Garda, Special Education in Charter Schools, supra note 186, at 688–89.
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admission. Students with disabilities put a large strain on the budgets
of charter schools and can threaten their viability, particularly charter
schools that are their own LEAs and thus lack economies of scale.196
In a traditional LEA—with numerous schools—paraprofessionals,
psychologists, special education directors, and other necessary
personnel can be used across many schools with the costs spread out
evenly amongst them. In a system of schools where most charter
schools are independent LEAs—essentially one-school school
districts—it is too expensive to hire the necessary personnel to assist
with what may amount to only a few students.197
Finally, and maybe most importantly, special education often runs
contrary to the mission and culture of charter schools. Many charter
schools adopt a “hedgehog” approach to education: focus on one
thing, and one thing only, in which to excel. As one school leader put
it, the school should have a:
[S]ingle minded focus on student achievement. If the school tried to
do too much—provide health care classes or parenting services, for
example—it risked failure on its core mission . . . in the same way
that the fox’s myriad plots are no match for the hedgehog’s
obsession with a single strategy.198

If the single-minded focus is college preparation, or academic
achievement, a student with disabilities, particularly severe ones that
require different services, may not fit in that mold. The school may
feel that the student would not be well served and that accepting such
students would divert its “hedgehog”-like, singular focus and degrade
the quality of the program. The specialized nature of charter schools
combined with the “hedgehog” strategy often leads to excluding
students with disabilities.199
Charter schools are also uniquely challenged to fulfill their
obligation to locate, identify, and evaluate students with disabilities
under the IDEA.200 This “child find” obligation compels LEAs to
identify and evaluate all students within their jurisdiction, but
Louisiana law defines “jurisdiction” for charter schools as “the
boundary of the educational facility.”201 In an all-charter school
system where schools are compelled to identify only students within

196.
197.
198.
199.
90.
200.
201.

Id. at 689, 695; Heilman, supra note 20, at 360, 371.
Garda, Special Education in Charter Schools, supra note 186, at 694–99.
CARR, supra note 24, at 41.
Id. at 42; Garda, Special Education in Charter Schools, supra note 186, at 689–
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111 (2014).
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28 § 1706 pt. XLIII, 230(A), (D)(4) (2013).
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their four walls, there is no mechanism in place to locate those
disabled students outside the public school system as required by the
IDEA.
“Because there is no centralized entity or authority
responsible for child find across the city, children who are homeless,
migrant, or simply not enrolled in public schools are not being found
and evaluated in accordance with federal law.”202
Charter schools also struggle to provide appropriate related
services and specialized instruction in violation of the IDEA.203 The
treatment of students with mental health issues and behavioral
problems is emblematic of the challenges in serving these students in
a decentralized system. More children suffer from mental health
issues in New Orleans than in any other part of the country.204 At the
same time, the number of treatment facilities for these students has
declined rapidly, and there is an extreme shortage of providers and
facilities.205 The onus has fallen on the schools, more than ever, to
either provide, or locate and pay for, proper treatment.
This is proving extremely difficult because students with severe
behavioral and mental health problems are particularly expensive and
difficult to educate. The prohibitive cost means some schools neglect
mental health and counseling, and very few schools operate programs
to address the needs of these students.206 The services once provided
by a large multi-school LEA—the OPSB—now must be provided by
single-school LEAs. The central office for social work and counseling
services no longer exists, leaving each charter school as an island to
provide these services.207 “New Orleans has become a case study in

202. Heilman, supra note 20, at 368.
203. See id. at 370–75; Jessica Williams, With Help of School Counseling, New
Orleans Family Tackles Mental Health Disorders of Three Siblings, LA. WKLY. (July
7, 2014), http://www.louisianaweekly.com/children-with-mental-illnesses-struggle-tofind-help-as-schools-hospital-systems-are-decentralized/ [hereinafter Williams, With

Help of School Counseling, New Orleans Family Tackles Mental Health Disorders of
Three Siblings] (claiming that many schools fail to properly educate students with
disabilities).
204. See Sarah Carr, Children with Mental Illnesses Struggle to Find Help as
Schools, Hospital Systems Are Decentralized, LENS (July 2, 2014), http://thelens
nola.org/2014/07/02/children-with-mental-illnesses-struggle-to-find-help-as-schoolshospital-systems-are-decentralized/ [hereinafter, Carr, Children with Mental
Illnesses].
205. See id.; Kamenetz, supra note 3; Williams, With Help of School Counseling,
New Orleans Family Tackles Mental Health Disorders of Three Siblings, supra note
203.
206. See Carr, Children with Mental Illnesses, supra note 204; Williams, With Help

of School Counseling, New Orleans Family Tackles Mental Health Disorders of
Three Siblings, supra note 203.
207. See Carr, Children with Mental Illnesses, supra note 204.
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how children and families are affected by rapid decentralization of
public education and mental health systems.”208 It is no surprise that
the Charter Management Organizations that run numerous schools,
and can benefit from economies of scale, have been the first charter
schools able to create programs for students with severe emotional
and behavioral issues.209
The treatment of students with disabilities has improved over time,
but much still needs to be done.210 The problems of identification,
exclusion, and service provision are the subject of a class action
litigation filed by the Southern Poverty Law Center in 2010.211 The
Complaint did not target individual charter schools, but instead
faulted the state and the RSD for failing in their statutorily mandated
oversight duties under the IDEA and Section 504.212 The Complaint
was not so much a call for action by charter schools as it was a call for
action by the state, the RSD, and the OPSB to create order out of the
chaos resulting from a decentralized special education system.213
The OPSB and the RSD recognized these problems and are
pursuing two separate avenues to address them. The first is
centralizing certain aspects of special education. In March of 2014,
the OPSB and the RSD entered into a Cooperative Endeavor
Agreement (CEA) to ensure shared responsibilities for programs
targeted to high needs students, including students with disabilities.214
Under the CEA, the OPSB and the RSD agree to open citywide
therapeutic programs by 2015-16 to address the shortage in the
private sector and within schools.215 In addition, the CEA creates a
citywide exceptional needs fund to help schools with the costs of

208. Id.
209. Williams, With Help of School Counseling, New Orleans Family Tackles
Mental Health Disorders of Three Siblings, supra note 203.
210. CARR, supra note 24, at 142.
211. Complaint at 17–19, P.B. v. Pastorek, No. 2:10-cv-04049 (E.D. La. Oct. 26,
2010); THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 12.
212. Complaint, supra note 211, at 17–19.
213. The lawsuit was recently settled. Danielle Dreilinger, Landmark New Orleans
Special Education Case Settled, Parties Say, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 19, 2014, http://
www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/12/parties_ask_federal_judge_to_a.html.
214. Press Release, Orleans Parrish Sch. Bd. & Recovery Sch. Dist., Orleans
Parrish School Board and Recovery District Collaborate to Expand Access to High
Quality Programs and Facilities for All Students (Mar. 18, 2014), available at http://
www.rsdla.net/ourpages/auto/2014/3/19/54148806/RSD_OPSB_Joint_Press_Release_
3%2018%2014.pdf.
215. Id.; see Kamenetz, supra note 3; Williams, New Orleans Public Schools Have
Seen Successes, Challenges in Past Year, New Report Says, supra note 13; Williams,

With Help of School Counseling, New Orleans Family Tackles Mental Health
Disorders of Three Siblings, supra note 203.
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serving students with the highest needs.216 The CEA also divides up
responsibility for certain legal obligations for which it was difficult to
ascertain responsibility in a decentralized system of schools. The
CEA clarifies that the OPSB will be responsible for “child find” for
all students not within public schools, including preschools.217 The
OPSB will provide special education services to preschool students,
and the parties will work together to place preschool students
identified as disabled. The OPSB also committed to providing all
special education services to students in private schools.218 Finally, in
the 2015-16 school year, the RSD will be piloting a project to ensure
students receive out of school mental health services.219
The importance of the CEA cannot be overstated—not only for
the services it will provide to students with disabilities, but also for the
ground-shaking paradigm shift it represents in New Orleans. For nine
years after the storm, there was neither coordination nor oversight of
special education services—an area of education that practically
demands centralized planning and economies of scale.220 Instead, it
was expected, or more likely hoped, that the market of school choice
would fill any unmet demand. The recognition by the OPSB and the
RSD that the unregulated system of schools would not step in to
serve the needs of students with disabilities, and that oversight and
centralization were necessary, was a major breakthrough in their
relationship and a major break from the post-Katrina model.221
But it is not a clean break. There is still hope that specialized
schools designed to meet the demands of students with disabilities
will spring out of the decentralized system. There are efforts to create
entire schools for children with mental or behavioral health needs.222
The OPSB recently approved a charter application for a school that
specializes in serving students with reading disabilities such as
dyslexia, and another is being planned to serve students with
emotional needs.223 This follows a nationwide trend of creating

216. Press Release, Orleans Parrish Sch. Bd. & Recovery Sch. Dist., supra note
214; see THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
217. Press Release, Orleans Parrish Sch. Bd. & Recovery Sch. Dist., supra note
214.
218. Id.; see also THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
219. Kamenetz, supra note 3.
220. Id.; Garda, Special Education in Charter Schools, supra note 186, at 670–73,
694–710.
221. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 26.
222. Carr, Children with Mental Illnesses, supra note 204.
223. Danielle Dreilinger, Orleans Parish School Board Votes to Ask for Return of
John McDonough High, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 22, 2014, http://www.nola.com/
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specialized schools for students with disabilities. There are over one
hundred charter schools across the country focused exclusively on
special education students, and their popularity is growing.224 Parents
often select the disability focused charter schools because their
specialization results in better services to their children.
New Orleans has steadily improved access, retention, and service
provision for students with disabilities in the last couple of years. It
has done so by centralizing services for students who need it and
plans on specializing schools for students who want it.
C.

Equity for English Language Learners

The growth in the number of English Language Learner (ELL)
students is being felt in many charter schools nationwide because
federal civil rights laws mandate that charter schools both identify
ELLs and provide them with effective education.225 This challenge is
on full display in New Orleans, where there has recently been a large
influx of non-native English speakers, particularly of Central
American and Vietnamese students. This puts tremendous strain on
a charter school system ill-prepared to serve these students.226
A recent survey by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) and
VAYLA (Vietnamese American Young Leaders Association) found
that the enrollment and registration practices of more than half of the

education/index.ssf/2014/07/orleans_parish_school_board_as.html
[hereinafter
Dreilinger, Orleans Parish School Board Votes to Ask for Return of John
McDonough High]. Cypress Academy, focusing on students with dyslexia, is
scheduled to open in the Fall of 2015. Thoughts on a Cypress Academy Education,
CYPRESS
ACADEMY,
http://www.cypressacademy.org/thoughts-on-a-cypressacademy-education.html. Noble Minds is a proposed school with an emotional
health emphasis, specializing in addressing students with emotional needs. See Mark
Waller, Education Entrepreneur Vote Winner Looks to Build a School That
Addresses Academics and Emotions, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 26, 2014, http://
www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2014/09/education_entrepreneur_vote_wi.html.
224. MICKELSON ET AL., supra note 70, at 14–16; Arianna Prothero, Special
Education Charters Renew Inclusion Debate, EDUC. WK. (Sept. 16, 2014),
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/09/17/04specialneedscharters.h34.html.
225. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012); KEVIN MURRAY, PROGRAM ON HUM. RTS. &
GLOBAL ECON., AT WHAT COST?: THE CHARTER SCHOOL MODEL AND THE HUMAN
RIGHT TO EDUCATION 19, 21 (2014); Black, supra note 183, at 474 (discussing how
charter schools nationwide are accused of denying admission to ELL students);
Charter Schools Face Challenge of English Language Learners, NAT’L CHARTER
SCH. RESOURCE CTR. (May 2012), http://www.charterschoolcenter.org/newsletter/
may-2012-charter-schools-face-challenge-english-language-learners.
226. See Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans’ Charter School System Ill-Prepared for
Jump in Central American Immigrants, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 22, 2014, http://
www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/08/central_american_immigrants_po.html
[hereinafter Dreilinger, Jump in Central American Immigrants].
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city’s public schools “violate federal law and discourage enrollment of
immigrant children and families.”227
The lack of translated
The
enrollment documents and services is also prevalent.228
Vietnamese Young Leaders of New Orleans filed a complaint with
the Department of Justice and the Office of Civil Rights against the
RSD, the OPSB, and independent charter operators alleging that the
failure of charter schools to provide interpretation and translation
services, and important information in a language that could be
understood by non-native speakers, violated Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act by discriminating on the basis of national origin.229 The
parties reached a Resolution Agreement wherein the schools agreed
to provide the requested document translation and translation
services.230
But translation services are the minimum legal requirement;
schools are compelled to take “appropriate action” to educate ELL
students,231 and that has proven to be a challenge. ELL students are
the most unevenly distributed of the vulnerable student populations
in New Orleans. During the 2011–12 school year, 45% of the schools
in the system had no ELL students, 50% had between 1% and 10%,
and four schools had an ELL population of 15% or higher.232 The
likely reason for this vast disparity in numbers is because only a small
number of schools have the capacity and programs to educate ELL
students, and parents flock to those programs.233
The concentration of ELL students into a limited number of
schools will continue so long as ELL programs remain uncoordinated
and decentralized.234 Much like special education, provision of ELL

227. Kari Dequine Harden, N.O. Public Schools Accused of Allegedly Violating
Federal Law, LA. WKLY. (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.louisianaweekly.com/n-o-publicschools-accused-of-allegedly-violating-federal-law/.
228. Danielle Dreilinger, Most New Orleans Public School Registration Forms
May Have Discouraged Immigrants, Report Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 15, 2014,
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/10/most_new_orleans_public_school_2
.html.
229. Complaint, Asian Am. L. Def. & Educ. Fund, Discrimination Against
National Origin Minority Students and Parents Who Are Limited English (LEP) in
Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB) and Recovery School District (RSD) Schools
(Aug. 2, 2013), http://aaldef.org/VAYLA%20AALDEF%20DOJ%20OCR%20
Complaint.pdf.
230. Resolution Agreement (No. 06131645), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/more/06131645-b.pdf.
231. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012).
232. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
233. See Dreilinger, Jump in Central American Immigrants, supra note 226.
234. See THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11; Dreilinger, Jump in
Central American Immigrants, supra note 226.
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services is expensive and requires a high level of expertise that is
difficult to achieve in a one-school LEA. ELL students stretch
resources, and the added cost is not covered by federal or state
money.235 This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to create an
effective ELL program in a single school that serves a limited number
of ELL students.236 Like special education, the schools with the best
ELL programs are part of charter networks that can leverage their
budgets and services across numerous schools.237 Because most
schools lack such services,238 parents are understandably drawn to the
schools with any programs, creating a vicious circle of concentration
of ELL students into a limited number of schools.
Despite commentators recognizing the growing need for the shared
services of an outside agency to offer ELL to students in the various
charter schools, it is not occurring.239 No mention of ELL services
exists in the CEA, and there is no indication that the OPSB and the
RSD are willing to work together to ensure ELL services are
provided in each school instead of only in select schools.
Rather, the opposite approach is being taken, and specialization,
rather than centralization, seems to be the route currently being
pursued to ensure equality for ELL students. OPSB recently
approved a new charter school, Foundation Prep, to cater to the ELL
needs of the immigrant population in New Orleans East.240 The
school was approved, in part, because it met “the needs of the
targeted community.”241
Unlike access, retention, and special
education, where some centralization of planning and service

235. See Claudio Sanchez, New Orleans Schools Face a Surge of Unaccompanied
Minors, NPR.ORG (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ed/2014/10/02/351438375/
new-orleans-schools-face-a-surge-of-unaccompanied-minors.
236. See MURRAY, supra note 225, at 20; THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra
note 2, at 11.
237. See Katy Reckdahl, New Orleans Charter Schools Scramble to Teach NonEnglish Speakers, HECHINGER REP. (Mar. 23, 2014), http://hechingerreport.org/neworleans-charter-schools-scramble-teach-non-english-speakers/.
238. See VIETNAMESE AM. YOUNG LEADERS ASS’N OF NEW ORLEANS, SIX PUBLIC
HIGH SCHOOLS, SIX YEARS AFTER THE STORM 22 (2012), http://www.vaylano.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/VAYLA_Raise_Your_Hand_Campaign_Full_
Report.pdf.
239. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
240. Danielle Dreilinger, Orleans Parish School Board Committee OK’s Two New
Charters for 2015, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 17, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/
index.ssf/2014/07/orleans_parish_school_board_co_12.html.
241. NAT’L ASS’N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, CHARTER SCHOOL
APPLICATION RECOMMENDATION REPORT 6 (2014), http://www.opsb.us/wp-content/
uploads/2012/10/NACSA-Recommendation-Foundation-Prep.pdf.
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coordination is occurring, ELL service provision, up to this point, has
been left to the system of schools to address unmet demand.
III. THE IMPACT OF MOVING TO A SYSTEM OF SCHOOLS ON
EQUITY
Achieving equality for vulnerable students after Katrina has been
an ongoing struggle in New Orleans. Equal educational opportunity
was practically non-existent for vulnerable students during the first
seven years when there was virtually no equality of access and little to
no oversight over retention, special education, or ELL policies. The
decentralized and loosely monitored system of schools created a
balkanized system, with the needs of vulnerable students often left
unmet. Parent choice also played a role in the concentration of
students by abilities, class, and race, though parent choice was, and
continues to be, circumscribed.
The two most powerful educational entities in town—the OPSB
and the RSD—did not centralize any services until 2012, when access
was mostly unified through OneApp, and expulsions were unified
through the expulsion review board and policy. In 2014, with
execution of the CEA, services were centralized for special education
services, but at the same time specialized schools for students with
disabilities and ELLs were opened. New Orleans’s dual approach to
ensuring equity—centralizing and unifying services for all schools on
the one hand while encouraging specialized schools to meet unmet
demands of vulnerable students on the other—brings to the fore a
debate that has occurred in education reform for two decades: how to
define educational equity.
A. Centralized Planning or the “Invisible Hand”
New Orleans is the first city to stand at the precipice of deciding
how best to ensure equity in a virtually all-charter school system.
One route relies on centralized planning, coordination, and resource
sharing to ensure each school provides equal access and education to
all types of students. This is the accepted version of equality
employed by schools since the Supreme Court uttered its most
important phrase in the twentieth century: “separate educational
Brown was about antifacilities are inherently unequal.”242
subordination and inclusion.243 This inclusion view of equality
requires each school to serve students of all races and abilities.
242. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1955).
243. See id.; James, supra note 70, at 1128.
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Nearly every civil rights statute in the field of education is founded
on this principle. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
segregation “in the schools of the local educational agencies of any
State.”244 The Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1974 prohibits
“segregation by an educational agency of students on the basis of
race, color, or national origin among or within schools . . . .”245 The
IDEA allows “separate schooling . . . only when the nature or severity
of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.”246 The Americans With Disabilities Act and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act similarly require schools to educate
students with disabilities in inclusive settings with general education
students rather than in separate schools.247
The inclusion view of equality, which has endured for over sixty
years, demands that every school attempt to educate every type of
student regardless of ability, aptitude, behavior, race, or
socioeconomic status.
It requires massive coordination and
economies of scale, especially to provide appropriate integrated
services for ELLs, students with disabilities, and students that are
particularly challenging.248
A few signs point to New Orleans pursuing inclusion equality
through collective planning and centralized control: creation of
OneApp, centralizing expulsions, and execution of the CEA. The
RSD and the OPSB came to recognize the importance of cooperation

244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6 (2012). Interestingly, the regulations under Title IX
prohibiting gender discrimination in education were amended in 2006 to expressly
permit single-sex schools. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012). For a discussion of this
change, see David S. Cohen & Nancy Levit, Still Unconstitutional: Our Nation’s
Experiment with State-Sponsored Sex Segregation in Education, 44 SETON HALL L.
REV. 339 (2014); Diane Heckman, Title IX Marks Its 35th Anniversary by Opening
the Doors to Single-Sex Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 237 EDUC. L.
REP. 1, 4 (2008).
245. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (2012). For an explanation of the laws affecting English
Language Learners, see Rosemary C. Salomone, Educating English Language
Learners: Reconciling Bilingualism and Accountability, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
115 (2012).
246. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2012).
247. 34 C.F.R. § 104.34 (2014); 34 C.F.R. § 104 App’x A, Para. 24 (2014); Essen v.
Bd. of Educ., No. 92 CV-1164, 1996 WL 191948 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1996) (denying
motion to dismiss claim under section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act based on policy of failing to modify curriculum to
permit education in the least restrictive environment).
248. ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, supra note 143, at 4; Cook, supra note
69.
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and systemic planning to achieve equity249 and that the services for
truants, special education students, and all at-risk youth were
“scattershot, overlapping, or non-existent.”250 But it remains to be
seen whether these are the first steps towards more centralization to
ensure equality or merely a stop-gap measure until the system can
create a thick “portfolio”251 of autonomous and specialized schools to
meet the unique demands of each student in the system. Even though
the RSD no longer directly operates any schools, and is instead
focusing on oversight of its charter schools and managing centralized
services in New Orleans,252 all signs point to the current centralization
acting as a bridge to a more fully functioning decentralized system.
First, it is unlikely that one unified or even cooperative governance
structure will exist in New Orleans for a very long time. The OPSB
will not be granted its wish that all schools return to its control and
the RSD cease operations in New Orleans.253 The OPSB asked the
legislature to compel return of high performing RSD schools to its
control but was rebuffed. Instead, the legislature gave each school a
choice of whether to stay with the RSD or move to the OPSB, and
even upon such a return, it would allow them to retain their LEA
status.254 Only two schools have elected to return to OPSB control,
and it is doubtful that many more will.255 In fact, there may be
249. Press Release, Orleans Parrish Sch. Bd. & Recovery Sch. Dist., supra note
214.
250. Dreilinger, In Move Towards Cooperation, supra note 53.
251. The term “portfolio school district” is often used to describe the emerging
model of educational governance that relies on numerous autonomous and
independent operators to run schools rather than a centralized school board. Daniel
Kiel, The Endangered School District: The Challenge and Promise of Redistributing
Control of Public Education, 22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 341, 346–52 (2013).
252. Dreilinger, Recovery School District Downsizes from 568 Employees to 92,
supra note 40.
253. Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans’ Two School Systems Close to Agreement
to Transfer Shared Services, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 17, 2014, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2014/02/new_orleans_two_school_systems.html;
Daniele
Dreilinger, What’s the Point of the Recovery School District Now? Critics Wonder,
Sept. 26, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/09/whats_the_point_of_
the_recover.html [hereinafter Dreilinger, What’s the Point of the Recovery School
District Now?].
254. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
255. Marta Jewson, Second New Orleans Charter School Opts for Return to Local
Control, NEW ORLEANS ADVOC. (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.theneworleans
see
also
advocate.com/news/11237604-123/second-new-orleans-charter-school;
Danielle Dreilinger, It’s a Wrap: 1 of 36 Recovery Charter Schools Wants to Transfer
to Orleans Parrish, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 20, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/
index.ssf/2014/12/its_a_wrap_1_of_36_recovery_ch.html#incart_river;
Jessica
Williams, More Charter Schools Now Eligible to Join Orleans Parish School Board,
but Will They Take the Leap?, LENS (Nov. 13, 2013), http://thelensnola.org/2013/11/
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movement the other way—from OPSB control to state control—
because, as of 2012, if OPSB charters do not like how they are treated
by the OPSB they can petition to change to a charter under state
control.256
Because of its failure to regain the schools via the legislature, the
OPSB sought the help of the courts. This approach also failed, as the
Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the OPSB’s lawsuit seeking return
of all schools to its control in March of 2014.257 Despite the original
intent of the RSD to be a stopgap measure to turn around schools and
then return them to local control,258 it is now a permanent fixture in
New Orleans.259
Because the RSD will not be displaced, cooperation between the
OPSB and the RSD is necessary to achieve any centralized planning.
Execution of the CEA is one step in this direction, but promising to
do something and actually doing it are two very different things.
Even after execution of the CEA, the OPSB and the RSD have
fought more than cooperated.260 The two parties continue to battle
13/more-charter-schools-now-eligible-to-join-orleans-parish-school-board-but-willanyone-take-the-leap/ (stating that Charter school operators are wary “of becoming
part of a dysfunctional local school system” plagued by a feuding school board);
Williams, New Orleans Public Schools Have Seen Successes, Challenges in Past Year,
New Report Says, supra note 13 (“There is little desire (by charter schools) to return
to the system of governance that previously existed.”).
256. 2012 Act 2 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:3983(B)(2)).
257. Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans’ State Takeover Schools Need Not Return
to Local Control, Court Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 1, 2014, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2014/04/new_orleans_state_takeover_sch.html.
258. DEBRA VAUGHAN ET AL., COWEN INST., TRANSFORMING PUBLIC EDUCATION
IN NEW ORLEANS: THE RECOVERY SCHOOL DISTRICT 2003–2011 1, available at
http://www.coweninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/History-of-the-RSDReport-2011.pdf (“Intended as a mechanism for restructuring and reform, the RSD
was never meant to be a permanent part of the public school governance landscape in
New Orleans. Instead, the RSD was meant to take control of and turn around
chronically failing schools for an initial period of five years. After that time, and
assuming adequate school improvement, schools would be released from the
jurisdiction of the RSD and returned to their local school board. Chartering schools
became a strategy used by the RSD even before Katrina. In 2010, BESE approved a
plan that allowed for the gradual transfer of some schools back to local control. As
of 2011, the majority of schools in Orleans Parish are charter schools authorized by
BESE under the auspices of the RSD, with the remainder being traditionally
operated public schools directly run by the RSD and the OPSB and charter schools
authorized by the OPSB.”); Bryant, supra note 10; Dreilinger, What’s the Point of the
Recovery School District Now?, supra note 253.
259. Dreilinger, What’s the Point of the Recovery School District Now?, supra
note 253.
260. Kari Dequine Harden, Charter School Votes to Return to OPSB Governance,
LA. WKLY. (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.louisianaweekly.com/charter-school-votes-toreturn-to-opsb-governance/ (explaining that OPSB recently considered suing RSD
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over return of physical buildings from the RSD to the OPSB in spite
of the CEA’s promised cooperation.261 The OPSB and the RSD still
make decisions independent of one another, and ultimate unified
governance seems unlikely, if not impossible.262
The second factor indicating that New Orleans is heading towards
decentralization is that centralized services and unified planning run
contrary to a fundamental underpinning of charter schools: site-level
autonomy. The charter movement is founded upon freedom from
regulations regarding budget, curriculum, and personnel.263
Autonomy and independence are the hallmarks of charter schools,
and the charters in New Orleans have fought tooth and nail to retain
them. If the RSD and the OPSB fail to cooperate moving into the
future, the system of schools—those sixty-three LEAs and forty-four
independent school boards—will certainly not seek service
centralization or uniformity that infringe on autonomy. As stated by
one of the most public and staunch charter supporters in New
Orleans, Neerav Kingsland, “[t]he ultimate goal of the New Orleans
public education system is not uniformity: it is diversity. And to
misunderstand this is to misunderstand the fundamental design
principle of our system.”264
Finally, it appears that the state legislature is expecting Charter
Management Organizations, or CMOs, (non-profit organizations that
operate multiple charter schools) to fill the centralized planning
gap.265 CMOs educate over half the students in New Orleans.266
CMOs are not LEAs in the legal sense, but they often act like them in
the practical sense, spreading costs and resources across the many
schools they operate. The state has great confidence in CMOs, as
seen by recent legislation making chartering easier for large CMOs
with proven records of success.267 It is unknown if the state believes

about school openings and the relationship remains tense); Dreilinger, In Move
Towards Cooperation, supra note 53.
261. Dreilinger, Orleans Parish School Board Votes to Ask for Return of John
McDonough High, supra note 223; Danielle Dreilinger, With John McDonough, All
New Orleans’ Takeover Schools Are on the Line, Supporters Say, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Sept.
12,
2014,
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/09/with_john_
mcdonogh_all_new_orl.html.
262. Ayers, supra note 3; see THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 4
(positing that long term shared governance seems unlikely).
263. Garda, Special Education in Charter Schools, supra note 186, at 663–66.
264. Kingsland, supra note 178.
265. 2012 Act 2 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:3983(3)(d)).
266. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
267. 2012 Act 2 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:3983(3)(d))
(permitting successful schools meeting automatic renewal guidelines to open operate
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that CMO centralized planning and service provision for the schools
they control act as an adequate substitute for system-wide services,
but it seems to be leaning that direction.
With cross-district and cross-school cooperation unlikely, it
appears New Orleans is relying exclusively on the invisible hand of
the market education system to create equity for at-risk students.268
This model requires belief in outcome or empowerment equality
rather than inclusion equality.
While empowerment equality cannot necessarily be called “new”—
it is possible to read Brown as simply empowering African-Americans
to choose schools that were previously cut-off to them instead of
compelling integration—it did not gain traction until the 1990s with
the advent of outcome accountability and charter schools.269 This
concept of equality found its popular roots in the influential
government report, A Nation at Risk, concluding that there was a
“rising tide of [educational] mediocrity that threatens our very future
as a Nation and a people.”270 The implied message was that twentyfive years of striving for inclusion equality since Brown had yielded
bad schools and that desegregation was mutually exclusive with
quality.271
In the push for improved performance during the decades that
followed—the accountability and choice era—equality was
repurposed from inclusion to outcomes and parental empowerment.
When parents choose and student outcomes improve, the argument
goes, equality is achieved irrespective of the demographics of the
schools. Inclusion equality essentially transformed into equal access
to quality schools through choice, and many embrace choice and
specialized educational environments as the new civil rights

two additional schools without a formal charter application); see also LA. ADMIN
CODE tit. 126 § 523 (2012).
268. The free-market education theorists believe that the marketplace is the ideal
way to allocate resources because each individual will be led by the invisible hand to
the social maximum position. James, supra note 70, at 1093–95.
269. See Robert A. Garda, Jr., Coming Full Circle: The Journey from Separate but
Equal to Separate and Unequal Schools, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 26–31
(2007).
270. NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., A NATION AT
RISK 1 (1983).
271. The implication is not true, as “the failures of integration have more to do
with failures of implementation . . . than with the inherent failures of the concept of
integration itself,” but the perception remains. James, supra note 70, at 1118.
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movement.272 Separate but equal became separate and equal,
propped up by increasing liberty through choice.273
Many scholars argue that choice and equality cannot co-exist.
Professor Osamudia James posits that “[i]f our goal is equality, then
choice must be minimized,”274 while Professor Derek Black argues
that the “individualized concept of education . . . lack[s] concern for
equality[, and] inequality is a necessary ingredient to competition.”275
While it is true that inclusion equality and unmitigated school choice
are likely mutually exclusive, market-based reforms certainly can
advance empowerment equality. Even the staunchest opponents of
choice recognize that “[i]n the abstract, choice can be an integral
feature of law or policy that promotes equal rights and
opportunities.”276
New Orleans may become the manifestation of this new equality.
Achieving inclusion equity requires planning and centralization, while

272. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Augustine, America’s New Civil Rights Movement:
Education Reform, Public Charter Schools and No Child Left Behind, 59 LA. B.J.
340, 343 (2012); Heilig Vasquez, Reframing the Refrain: Choice as a Civil Rights
Issue, 1 TEX. EDUC. REV. 83, 83 (2013), available at http://txedrev.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/11/Heilig_Reframing-the-Refrain_TxEdRev.pdf;

Michelle

Bernard,

School Choice Is the Most Critical Civil Rights Issue of Our Time: It’s the Modern
Extension of Brown v. Board of Education, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2011/02/01/school-choice-is-the-most-criticalcivil-rights-issue-of-our-time; Rand Paul, PAUL: It’s Time to Extend MLK’s Dream
to School Choice Aspirants and Nonviolent Offenders, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/30/paul-extending-the-reach-ofkings-dream/#ixzz2dSXHp0Fy; Reince Priebus, Why School Choice is a Civil Rights
Issue, CNN.COM (May 17, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/17/opinion/priebusschool-choice/; Diane Ravitch, Julian Vasquez Heilig: Why School Choice Is NOT
the Civil Rights Issue of Our Time, DIANE RAVITCH’S BLOG (Dec. 2, 2013),
http://dianeravitch.net/2013/12/02/julian-vasquez-heilig-why-school-choice-is-not-thecivil-rights-issue-of-our-time/. Even the NAACP has included choice and charter
schools in its civil rights agenda. James, supra note 70, at 1099.
273. See, e.g., Derek W. Black, Education’s Elusive Future, Storied Past and the
Fundamental Inequities Between, 46 GA. L. REV. 557, 562–71 (2012); Susan E. Eaton
& Gary Orfield, Introduction to DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION xiv (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton
eds., 1996); Garda, Jr., supra note 262, at 3–5; James, supra note 70, at 1115–16;
Goodwin Liu, “History Will Be Heard”: An Appraisal of the Seattle/Louisville
Decision, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 73 (2008); Daniel J. Losen, Challenging

Racial Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of the No Child Left Behind Act’s RaceConscious Accountability, 47 HOW. L.J. 243, 244 (2004); Saiger, supra note 142, at 50
(“The choice debate, in many respects, instantiates the republic’s longstanding
contest between equality and liberty.”).
274. James, supra note 70, at 1128.
275. Black, supra note 183, at 459.
276. James, supra note 70, at 1133; see also Kiel, supra note 17, at 377 (noting that
portfolio school districts are at high risk of creating separate and unequal schools).
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empowerment equality only requires entities to act in their own selfinterest: parents choosing what is best for their children and schools
specializing to meet their demands. This appears to be where New
Orleans is headed—not by conscious choice but by default, an
inherent outcome of the fractured governance in a system of schools.
As Professor Julie Mead points out: “If you set up a system based on
market principles that are designed to allow schools to serve
particular interests, then we’re going to get pockets of interest.”277
This is already occurring in New Orleans. There are a wide variety
of schools catering to numerous different types of students from
which parents can choose.278 In high school alone, parents can select
from schools focused on foreign language fluency,279 exposure to
college courses,280 college preparation, STEM (science, technology,
engineering, and math) for traditionally underserved students,281
STEM for select students,282 military and maritime studies,283 creative
arts,284 and technical skills,285 as well as alternative schools designed
for over-age and academically behind students,286 and a school

277. Prothero, supra note 224.
278. SIMS & VAUGHAN, BEATING THE ODDS, supra note 13, at 8. But see THE
COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 29 (“The quality and diversity of choices
may be limited.”); Waller, supra note 223 (explaining that there has been a
“proliferation of similar kinds of schools”).
279. E.g., INT’L HIGH SCH. NEW ORLEANS, http://www.ihsnola.org/about/ (last
visited Mar. 15, 2015).
280. E.g., BARD EARLY C. NEW ORLEANS, http://www.bard.edu/ecno/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015).
281. E.g., NEW ORLEANS CHARTER SCI. & MATHEMATICS HIGH SCH.,
http://www.noscihigh.org/about-sci-high.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
282. E.g., McDonogh 35 College Preparatory High School, LA SCH. FINDER,
http://laschoolfinder.com/schools/detail/67/McDonogh-35-College-Preparatory-HighSchool (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
283. E.g., NEW ORLEANS MILITARY & MARITIME ACADEMY, http://nomma.net/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
284. E.g., Academic Studio, NOCCA, http://www.nocca.com/academic-studio/ (last
visited Mar. 15, 2015).
285. E.g., Innovations in Education, FIRSTLINE SCH., http://www.firstline
schools.org/innovations-in-education.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (“NOLA Tech
will provide students the opportunity to earn a high school diploma and technical
certificate concurrently.”).
286. See, e.g., RENEW ACCELERATED HIGH SCH., http://www.renewschools.org/
apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=182758&type=d&pREC_ID=457304 (last visited
Mar. 152, 2015) (“ReNEW Accelerated High School . . . aims to push our most
academically behind students by accelerating their graduation and becoming
college ready. The innovative program is one-of-a-kind in the city, providing our
over-age, under-credited students the ability to accelerate their high school course
work and earning a true High School Diploma.”); THE NET CHARTER HIGH SCH.,
http://thenetnola.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). The NET is an alternative
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exclusively for expelled students.287 As noted above, there will soon
be a school for dyslexic students and one for ELL students, and a
proposed school will specialize in addressing students with emotional
needs.288 There are even schools that promise diversity—not because
they believe that separate is inherently unequal, but merely that
parent-chosen integration is a superior education model.289 The
education market continues to “recognize gaps in the city’s
educational landscape and launch schools to meet these needs.”290
Moreover, the state is encouraging specialization. The RSD is
recruiting charter operators to fill unmet needs.291 The legislature is
pushing for specialized charter operators as shown by their
amendment to the charter-enabling statute in 2012 charging BESE
with actively recruiting “chartering groups that offer a program of
study or propose to offer a program of study that effectively addresses
regional workforce needs, such as career and technical education,
industry-based certifications, and vocational course work.”292 The
charter accountability system was also changed to encourage
specialized charter schools by allowing for “alternative evaluation” of
charter schools serving “unique populations.”293
Even when schools are not designed for specific student
populations, the fact that few provide specialized services makes them
popular for these types of students. For example, word spread about
Esperanza Charter School’s ELL program, which has induced more

ungraded school designed to serve students who have dropped out, are over-age,
have been expelled, or who struggle academically or behaviorally in a traditional high
school setting. See Louisiana Making Changes to Programs for At-Risk Students, NO
DROPOUTS,
http://www.nodropouts.org/blog/louisiana-making-changes-programsrisk-students?page=5 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
287. E.g., CRESCENT CITY LEADERSHIP ACADEMY, http://crescentleadership
academy.com/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
288. See Waller, supra note 223.
289. E.g., BRICOLAGE ACADEMY OF NEW ORLEANS, http://www.bricolagenola.org/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015); MORRIS JEFF COMMUNITY SCHOOL,
http://www.morrisjeffschool.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015); see also Leslie Jacobs,
New Orleans Charter Schools Are All The Same? Not True: Leslie Jacobs, TIMESPICAYUNE, Oct. 3, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/10/new_
orleans_charter_schools_ar_1.html (“Morris Jeff Community School is purposefully
attracting a diverse set of families to a school that is rooted in its surrounding MidCity neighborhood.”).
290. Jacobs, supra note 289. There is also a school focused on computer literacy.
See Dreilinger, OneApp Lists More Than 130 New Programs, supra note 103.
291. See SIMS & VAUGHAN, BEATING THE ODDS, supra note 13, at 8.
292. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3981(8) (2012).
293. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 1103(B) (2014).
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ELL students to apply.294 Any school that offers services for
marginalized students can expect the same results. Whether a school
is designed specifically for a student population or simply attracts
particularized groups by providing services that do not exist
elsewhere, the end result is concentrated student populations.
Of course, the current New Orleans schools are as far from
achieving the new equality as the old New Orleans schools were from
achieving inclusion equality. There is a full-throated debate about
whether choice models improve student outcomes or narrow
achievement gaps. Many believe school choice must be rejected
because it will never achieve its promises.295 Others believe that
inclusion equality also could not live up to its promises, and call for its
abandonment.296 To some, “[t]he proper question is whether market
based choice reduces equality relative to our already racialized and
unequal system based upon geographic choice.”297
But in New Orleans, where the new system is still finding itself, the
problem should be considered in the abstract. It is critical that the
city decide if it wants empowerment equality or inclusion equality.
Putting aside issues of implementation and assuming either model can
achieve all that it promises, which should New Orleans strive to
achieve?
Inclusion equality promises diversity in schools;
empowerment equality promises diversity of schools, but not within
schools. Without a concerted effort to centralize services, the system
will march automatically towards empowerment equality.

294. See Jacobs, supra note 289.
295. See, e.g., JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF THE
MARKET METAPHOR (1994); WHO CHOOSES? WHO LOSES? CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS
AND THE UNEQUAL EFFECTS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 13-14, 189 (Bruce Fuller & Richard
Elmore eds., 1996); Stephen Eisdorfer, Public School Choice and Racial Integration,
24 SETON HALL L. REV. 937, 943 (1993); Edward B. Fiske & Helen F. Ladd, When
Schools Compete: A Cautionary Tale, 26 CAN. J. OF EDUC. 259, 261 (2000); James,
supra note 70, at 1128.
296. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Derek A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 531 (1980); ROBERT L. CARTER, A Reassessment of
Brown v. Board, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVE ON SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 21 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980); Raneta J. Lawson, The Child Seated
Next To Me: The Continuing Quest For Equal Educational Opportunity, 16 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 35, 37 (1991); LeRoy Pernell, Suffering the Children: 35 Years of
Suspension, Expulsion, and Beatings—The Price of Desegregation, 7 HARV.
BLACKLETTER J. 119, 125 (1990). For a thorough discussion of the critiques of
Brown, see JAMES PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2002).
297. Saiger, supra note 142, at 53–54.
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Lessons from New Orleans

In some respects, drawing lessons from New Orleans to apply in
other cities is difficult because its path has been so unique. While
most major urban cities are slowly transitioning from a unified school
system into a system of schools, New Orleans was catapulted into
decentralization and is easing into centralization.
Transferrable lessons are also hard to glean because, unlike every
other school system, New Orleans is almost all charter schools.
Traditional arguments about “opt-out” and inequality between
charters and traditional schools simply do not exist in a system that
has collectively opted-out of traditional governance.298 There are no
traditional schools on which to rely to educate the most challenging
students. Instead of dumping difficult to educate students into the
traditional schools, as happened in New Orleans directly after the
storm and as occurs in many other cities, the charter system in New
Orleans is now compelled to deal with them. The debate in New
Orleans, as opposed to the rest of the country, is not whether to have
charter schools, or how many to have, but how to make them work
equally for all.
It is easy to argue that New Orleans is proof that equity cannot be
found among decentralization, especially for vulnerable and
subordinated groups. The unrestrained system of schools for the first
seven years after Katrina almost completely failed special education
students, English language learners, the poor, and the powerless. But
such a conclusion, indeed any conclusion, from this time is too facile
because the system was rebuilt virtually from scratch. During this
period the school system was still physically rebuilding from tragedy,
and the students were emotionally rebuilding.299 While Katrina’s
waters receded quickly, the schools swayed and rocked for years, only
recently stabilizing. The turbulence ebbed as the “portfolio” of
schools grew, students found permanent schools, schools found
permanent homes, and the RSD settled in. Lessons transferrable to
other cities are difficult to glean from this unique rebuilding era. But
a few things are certain.

298. Many critiques of charter school and choice presume their coexistence with
traditional school districts and are hard to translate when the system is almost
entirely charter schools. See, e.g., Black, supra note 183; James, supra note 70.
299. Students in New Orleans are still suffering from high levels of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder. See Jed Lipinski, Black Teens in New Orleans Four Times as Likely
to Have PTSD, Survey Shows, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 18, 2014, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2014/11/black_adolescents_in_new_orlea.html.
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First, the free market of schools does not operate like a free market
in all respects. The reasons are many, but one critical reason
displayed in New Orleans is that education consumers do not act
rationally, or at least how economists expect them to act.300 Contrary
to expectations, parents often keep their children in low-performing
schools and do not initially select high-performing schools. The
behavior has been shown in New York301 and is certainly the case in
New Orleans.302 Very few schools in the city, no matter how
consistently poor-performing, have closed due to insufficient students
or funds.303 Because market forces do not send poorly performing
schools out of business, the chartering authorities are the primary
agents closing charter schools in New Orleans.304
With the government, more than market demand, controlling
school quality, it is imperative that the charter authorization process
be rigorous and the threat of closure meaningful.305 While this may
not be happening nationally, it appears to be occurring in New
Orleans, as a large majority of charter applications are denied and a
dozen charters have been shut down by the state.306 Before 2008,

300. See Susan L. DeJarnatt, School Choice and the (Ir)rational Parent, 15 GEO. J.
1, 5 (2008); James, supra note 70, at 1104–05.
301. See LORI NATHANSON ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL CHOICE IN NEW YORK CITY: A
REPORT ON THE SCHOOL CHOICES AND PLACEMENTS OF LOW-ACHIEVING STUDENTS,
iv (2013).
302. See Cook, supra note 69.
303. See id.
304. See id. This is true in any portfolio school district. See Kiel, supra note 17, at
388.
305. See NATL. ALLIANCE OF PUB. CHARTER SCH., THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC
CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 4 (2014) [hereinafter
NATL. ALLIANCE OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC
CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT] (“It is preferable to have a small and consistent
percentage of schools close, but the percentage should not be too high as such a
number reveals inadequate approval and oversight processes.”); NATL. ALLIANCE OF
CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, THE STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOL AUTHORIZING 2
(2013),
http://www.pageturnpro.com/National-Association-of-Charter-SchoolAuthorizers/58053-The-State-of-Charter-School-Authorizing-2013/index.html#1
[hereinafter NATL. ALLIANCE OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, THE STATE OF
CHARTER SCHOOL AUTHORIZING]; Black, supra note 183, at 486; Dylan P. Grady,
Charter School Revocation: A Method for Efficiency, Accountability, and Success,
41 J.L. & EDUC. 513, 518 (2012).
306. Black, supra note 183, at 486; Cook, supra note 69. Louisiana has had a five
percent charter school closure rate between the 2008 and 2012 school years, which is
the second highest rate in the country. NATL. ALLIANCE OF CHARTER SCH.
AUTHORIZERS, THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT, supra
note 305, at 78; see also NATL. ALLIANCE OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, THE
STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOL AUTHORIZING, supra note 305, at 10 (showing that there
has been a steep decline in the authorization rate in Louisiana). BESE has not
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there were no charter revocations because of the intense politicization
of closure decisions.307 The revocation process was de-politicized in
2008, when the Louisiana Department of Education issued bright line
renewal and revocation standards for the charters it oversaw. This
change insulated authorizers from outside pressures when making
controversial revocation and renewal decisions.308 Accordingly,
crystal rules for charter revocation and renewal are a critical
component of any choice system.
One important aspect of the free-market analogy remains true
though: schools will specialize to meet unmet demands, and parents
will often prefer specialized schools. An ELL school was created
because there were insufficient ELL services offered in the existing
schools. A special education school was created for the same reason.
Future specialized schools will continue to crop up because of
“market” forces and because the state is pushing for it. Parents may
not be selecting schools as an economist would expect them to—
based on school performance scores alone—but they are selecting
them based on the “fit” between the school and the child.309 Left
unchecked, specialized schools will flourish and many parents will
select segregation.
A second clear lesson is that a nascent, unrestrained system of
autonomous schools will leave hard to educate students behind. Once
the education system became stable, the OPSB and RSD recognized
that the loosely regulated system of schools produced winners and
losers, which is unacceptable for public schooling. Some level of
centralization and planning is necessary to ensure equity when a
majority of the charter schools are independent LEAs.
In order to achieve this, the chartering authority must act in a
planning and centralizing role, not merely an authorizing and
oversight role, especially for authorizers of charter schools that are
independent LEAs.
Charter authorizers traditionally review
applications, approve charter schools, and then get out of the way
until it is time to determine if the charter should be renewed or

renewed several charters for poor academic performance. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at
16–17; Danielle Dreilinger, 30% of New Orleans Schools Face Charter Renewal
Decisions This Fall, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 3, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/
index.ssf/2014/09/30_of_new_orleans_charter_scho.html [hereinafter Dreilinger, 30%
of New Orleans Schools Face Charter Renewal Decisions This Fall].
307. See Garda, supra note 32, at 93–95.
308. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, §§ 1501, 1503, 1701, 1703 (2012); see also
Dreilinger, 30% of New Orleans Schools Face Charter Renewal Decisions This Fall,
supra note 306.
309. See Saiger, supra note 136, at 56.
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revoked. The National Alliance of Charter School Authorizers
publishes what is considered the gold standard in authorizer practices,
and none of these Essential Practices deal with provision of services
or centralizing and planning for the system of schools.310 The RSD
operated under this traditional standard for authorizers for the first
seven years after Katrina, and gross inequities developed within the
system. It is only once the RSD and BESE expanded their role
beyond mere authorizer and evaluator that the necessary centralized
planning and services could begin.
There is a nascent national trend for charters to partner with their
authorizing school districts for resource sharing and planning,
especially for special education.311 New Orleans is proof that such
partnering is essential to ensure vulnerable populations are properly
served. This is why the Annenberg Institute calls for a unified school
plan and minimum academic, social, and educational opportunities
that all taxpayer funded schools should provide in a system of charter
schools to ensure proper provision of specialized services.312 The
authorizer is the best-positioned entity to provide this unification.
Directly related, charter school autonomy must be circumscribed to
allow the authorizer to control certain services centrally. I have
argued elsewhere that charter schools should not be permitted to be
independent LEAs for special education purposes.313 The same
argument would apply for ELL services as well. Charter schools
should be compelled to work with authorizers for provision of these
key services that require economies of scale and high levels of
expertise, at least until they prove they can provide these services
independently. Charters should have to earn their autonomy when it
comes to serving vulnerable groups, rather than being granted it and
waiting to see if they fail.
A third important lesson—at least in districts where the state has
taken over large swaths of schools—is that there must be either an
exit strategy or a concrete division of responsibility between the state
takeover district and the local school district. Having two powerful
school districts in one geographic area has proven contentious and

310. See NATL. ALLIANCE OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, THE STATE OF
CHARTER SCHOOL AUTHORIZING, supra note 305, at 14.
311. See Arianna Prothero, Often Foes, Some Districts and Charters Forge
Partnerships, EDUC. WK. (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/10/
15/08collaboration.h34.html.
312. ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, supra note 143, at 4.
313. Garda, Special Education in Charter Schools, supra note 186, at 694–701.
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confusing in New Orleans.314 Uncertainty over how long the RSD
would be present and when, and under what circumstances, schools
would be returned to the OPSB inhibited by any centralized planning.
There was no centralized planning in New Orleans until 2012, when it
became apparent that the RSD was a permanent fixture. Once the
legislature would not compel the RSD to turn its schools back over to
the OPSB, and no RSD charter would voluntarily submit to OPSB
control, the OPSB realized the RSD was here to stay and that all the
schools would inevitably become charter schools. Only once the new
system found firm footing was there any meaningful systemic
planning, and that is when the education of vulnerable populations
began to improve. This problem could have been solved up front,
with a specific and enumerated plan for return of schools to local
control.
It is also important that the exit and return plans hinge on the
performance of the school board as well as the performance of the
schools. It defies common sense for a state to take a failing school
from a district, turn it around to a high performing school, and then
turn it back over to the district that mismanaged it in the first place.
But this is precisely how most state takeover plans are conceived—as
stopgap measures until the school is turned around. It is much wiser
to focus on the quality of the school and the quality of the return
district. This was proposed, and rejected, in New Orleans. Instead,
the decision has been left up entirely to the RSD charters on whether
to return to the OPSB, and even if they return, they retain their
independent LEA status.315 Most in the city agree that the elected
school board, rather than the state, should be in charge of the schools,
but the RSD charters will not voluntarily return to the OPSB because
they believe it is incompetent, divided, and contentious.316 If specific
and concrete school district performance benchmarks were created,
just as specific and concrete school performance benchmarks exist,
the return decision could be taken out of the hands of charter schools,
and there would be a finite term on the state takeover school district.
Finally, and maybe most importantly, the system as a whole must
decide what type of equality it wants to pursue: inclusion equality,
empowerment and outcome equality, or some mix of the two.
Without deliberate planning, outcome equality becomes the default
mode that inevitably grows out of decentralization. Pursuit of
314. See Garda, supra note 32, at 80–87.
315. See LA. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 3973(2)(b)(vii) (2013); Garda, supra note 32, at
82–86.
316. See THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
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inclusion equality requires more planning and a conscious desire to
pursue. New Orleans never had the opportunity for such planning on
the heels of Katrina and has still not engaged in meaningful, coherent
dialogue on this critical question. Without it, New Orleans is
unwittingly choosing the outcome and specialization route to equality.
CONCLUSION
The charter school system in New Orleans is permanent and
enduring. Vested interests in the city, most importantly parents,
strongly support choice and charter schools.317 The question in New
Orleans is not whether to embrace or discard them, but how to ensure
that they create equal educational opportunity within the system of
schools.
The New Orleans system of schools lacks a uniform vision for
achieving equity for its most challenging students. Without any single
entity in control, there is no agreed-upon goal for where the system
should stabilize. One endpoint is achieving equality through a thick
market of schools serving the unique needs of individual students.
While the city is very far from a system of high-quality, specialized
schools serving the needs of all students, including vulnerable ones, it
is unclear whether this is the vision of equality New Orleans is trying,
or even wants, to achieve. But this is the method of achieving
equality—concentrated and specialized—that New Orleans will fall
into automatically because it happens by default, without planning,
when parents and schools look after their own individual interests.
If New Orleans seeks to achieve inclusion equality, where each
school can serve every type of student, much work needs to be done.
The OPSB and the RSD must put aside their differences and work
together to create uniform policies and centralized services. Charter
schools must relinquish some of their cherished autonomy and accept
that certain vulnerable students cannot be served properly in a singleschool LEA. Coordination, cooperation, and unified vision must
somehow be found in a decentralized system of schools.

317. Ninety percent of parents think choice is important, while sixty-six percent
believe schools have improved, and seventy-eight percent support charter schools.
OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 10; see also Stephanie Grace, The Daily Beast
Congratulates Mitch Landreiu on School Reform, GAMBIT WKLY. (Dec. 18, 2012),
http://www.bestofneworleans.com/blogofneworleans/archives/2012/12/17/the-dailybeast-congratulates-mitch-landrieu-on-school-reform
(discussing
how
Mayor
Landrieu champions charter schools).

